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2.1 Introduction
Globalization in the labor market is qualitatively diﬀerent from global-
ization of goods or asset markets. With international migration, the factor
of production (labor services) crosses national boundaries embodied in in-
dividuals. As a result, trading in goods and services and capital ﬂows are
fundamentally diﬀerent from trading in labor services (people). In Adam
Smith’s words, “man is of all sorts of luggage the most diﬃcult to be trans-
ported.” Nevertheless, international migration does respond strongly to
market signals, either legally, when the policy environment allows, or ille-
gally, when there are artiﬁcial barriers to mobility. International migration
alters the labor supply and the demographic characteristics of both the
sending and the receiving countries. Moreover, it inﬂuences economic
growth, patterns of trade, income distribution, and the distribution of po-
litical power within and between countries.
In this paper we shall illustrate that the globalization of world markets
has been of prime economic importance in the two key eras: the age of mass
migration, which rose to a crescendo between 1850 and 1913, and the era of
“constrained” mass migration of the last ﬁfty years. The focus is on inter-
continental migrations: from Europe to the New World and from parts of
Asia to other areas around the globe in the late nineteenth and early twen-
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rors of omission or commission.tieth centuries, and primarily from the third world to the ﬁrst world and the
Persian Gulf in the late twentieth century. We begin (in section 2.2) by map-
ping out the diﬀerent eras of international migration and labor mobility
over the last four centuries. In the following section (section 2.3) we exam-
ine the underlying forces that drove mass migration in the two eras of glob-
alization. Perhaps even more important are the eﬀects of migration on send-
ing and receiving countries and the impact of these economic eﬀects on
what has been dubbed the “policy backlash” (section 2.4). Although the
fundamentals driving international migration were similar in the two peri-
ods, the nature, direction, and consequences of the ﬂows reﬂect changes in
the structure and integration of the international economy. The eﬀects of in-
ternational migration are conditioned both by structural changes in the
world economy and by changes in policy regimes. In turn, the policy
regimes have evolved in response to changing economic structures, political
developments, and migration itself (section 2.5). This paper concludes with
an overview of migration ﬂows and policy in the past, and with speculation
about the future (section 2.6).
2.2 International Migration in Diﬀerent Economic Eras
2.2.1 Contracts and Coercion, 1600–1790
The discovery of the Americas stimulated a steady stream of migrants
(voluntary and involuntary) from Europe and Africa. But these streams
were a mere trickle compared to what came later. At ﬁrst the conditions
were harsh and the economic returns were too low in relation to the costs to
make mass migration feasible. High transport costs and the risks (both ﬁ-
nancial and to life itself) and uncertainties involved ensured that only the
richest and the most intrepid could bear the cost. Although the migrations
of religious groups and other pioneers gradually increased, their numbers
were dwarfed by those who came under contract or coercion. By the end of
the eighteenth century something like eight million had journeyed to the
New World, but largely as slaves from Africa (about 7 million) and convicts
from Great Britain, or indentured servants from western Europe, whose mi-
gration was ﬁnanced by others (see Lovejoy 1983, 478, 496). Coercion and
contracts were the chief means through which the New World recruited its
labor force during this period.
It is estimated that about 700,000 Europeans migrated to North America
and the Caribbean between 1650 and 1780, more than half to the mainland
colonies. Of these, between one-half and two-thirds came under contracts
of indentured servitude (Galenson 1981, 17; Engerman 1986, 271). Around
1650 a passage to America would have cost about £6, or about ﬁve months’
wages for an agricultural laborer in southern England (Eltis 1983, 258). In-
dentured servitude evolved in response to this overwhelming wealth con-
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capital markets. Under this system servants were given free passage to the
colonies and then, on arrival, sold (at an average price of about £8) to mer-
chants or farmers.1 But by the end of the eighteenth century ﬁxed-period
contract servitude for Europeans was in decline, partly because of dimin-
ishing European supply, but more importantly because of the expansion of
another form of recruitment: slavery.
The sharp rise in slave imports from the late seventeenth century, ﬁrst to
the West Indies and then to the mainland colonies of the Chesapeake and
South Carolina prevented the implicit wages of indentured servants from
rising (i.e., prevented the contract length from falling) and slowed the
growth in numbers (Grubb 1992, 196). The slave trade continued to grow in
the eighteenth century, particularly to the cotton- and tobacco-growing
colonies and states on the mainland of North America and to the sugar-
growing colonies of the Caribbean.
The abolition of the slave trade to the United States in 1807, the emanci-
pation of slaves in the northern United States, and the emancipation in the
British colonies in 1834 ended these forced migrations, although slavery it-
self lasted longer. The decline in the supply of slave labor led to a revival of
contract labor for work on plantations and in mines, this time primarily
from China and India, to Southeast Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean and Pa-
ciﬁc Islands, the Caribbean, and North and South America, which lasted in
some cases until the start of World War I (Engerman 1986). Although the
numbers of these nineteenth-century contract laborers to the New World,
as well as coerced convicts to Australia, were insigniﬁcant in comparison
with the movement of free migrants, contract labor migration remained the
dominant form of labor migration from the sending regions in Asia.
2.2.2 The Rise of Pioneer Free Settlers, 1790–1850
The intercontinental ﬂow of free settlers, from northwest Europe to the
New World, which was slow at ﬁrst, gathered pace in the early nineteenth
century. In the United States the inﬂows outnumbered slaves by the end of
the eighteenth century, but elsewhere the transition came later. For the
Americas as a whole it was not until the 1830s that the decadal ﬂow of free
migrants exceeded that of African slaves (table 2.1). And according to Eltis
(1983, 255) it was not until the 1880s that the cumulative sum of European
immigration overtook that of coerced labor from Africa. In Australia, too,
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1. The sale price covered the shipping cost, and the comparison of this price with the pres-
ent value of the servant’s expected productivity over and above maintenance determined the
length of bound labor—usually between four and seven years—after which the servant was
freed. According to one historian of indentured servitude, “Although the institutional
arrangements of the indenture system were diﬀerent from those surrounding the immigration
of free Europeans to colonial America, the same is not necessarily true of the servants’ mo-
tives. Though some of the hardships they faced may have been diﬀerent, the potential rewards
were much the same for servants as for other European immigrants” (Galenson 1981, 113).coerced labor declined as the proportion of free settlers outnumbered the
ﬂow of convicts from the 1830s, although the absolute numbers are tiny
compared with those in North America.
In North and South America, as well as Australia, free settlers began to
arrive in ever larger numbers. Although some ﬂed wars or sought better
democratic rights and religious freedom, the vast majority were attracted
by growing prosperity and by the prospect of becoming landowners or ten-
ant farmers. These migrants traveled in family groups, often with the inten-
tion of starting or joining new communities at the New World’s frontier.2
These groups were often led by farmers, craftsmen, and artisans, and they
originated chieﬂy in northwest Europe. It is estimated that three-quarters of
the English and Welsh, two-thirds of the Dutch, and two-thirds of those
from Osnabrück and Baden who migrated to the United States in the 1830s
were in family groups and one-third of them were children under ﬁfteen (Er-
ickson 1994, 143).
Migrants to Australia needed even greater incentives, and in order to at-
tract free migrants a policy of assisted emigration was begun in 1834. Some
migrants were given free passage, either under the government scheme or
under a bounty system that provided incentives for existing settlers to bring
new settlers to the Australian colonies.3 In South America, too, the longer
journey times and more arduous conditions, which prolonged coerced and
68 Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton
Table 2.1 Free and Coerced Migration, 1790s to 1840s (thousands per annum)
1790s 1800s 1810s 1820s 1830s 1840s
Americas
Slaves — — — 60.25 56.34 44.51
Free migrants — — — 15.38 67.07 178.53
% free — — — 20.2 54.3 80.0
Australia
Convicts 0.49 0.43 1.70 3.23 5.00 3.37
Free settlers 0.02 0.05 0.08 1.03 5.72 14.09
% free 3.4 10.4 4.5 24.1 53.4 80.7
Sources: Americas: Eltis (1983, 256); Australia: free immigration from Berlin (1994, 22); con-
victs from Shaw (1966, 363–68).
Note: Dashes indicate data are not available.
2. Erickson (1994, 19–50) found that English migrants preferred Wisconsin, Illinois, Michi-
gan, and Iowa to Massachusetts or Connecticut and that even those from industrial or urban
backgrounds were attracted to farming and often bought unimproved land.
3. Under the scale issued in 1837 the bounties were £36 for a man and wife, £18 for an un-
married male or female, £10 for a child aged eight to fourteen, and £5 for a child aged one to
seven (Madgwick 1937, 154). For the adults, certain age limits applied. The individual spon-
soring the migrant usually paid travel and settlement costs from the bounty received. Under
the government scheme, emigration agents recruited prospective migrants for free passages. It
is estimated that about 40 percent of all free migrants between 1848 and 1872 were government
assisted.contract labor, delayed the onset of free migration. Incentives in the form of
free passages were used to encourage the ﬂow of free settlers.
2.2.3 The Age of Mass Migration from Europe, 1850–1913
It was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that mass mi-
gration can really be said to have taken hold. The ﬁgures for (gross) inter-
continental emigration from Europe are plotted as ﬁve-year averages in ﬁg-
ure 2.1. In the ﬁrst three decades after 1846 the numbers averaged around
300,000 per annum, doubling in the following two decades and exceeding
one million per annum by the turn of the century. The ﬁrst wave of the late
1840s was associated with famine and revolution in Europe, and the second
wave with the shift in ocean transport from sail to steam. The nominal cost
of passage on the North Atlantic route remained roughly constant (Keeling
1999), although it declined relative to average wages. Moreover, the transi-
tion from sail to steam cut typical transit times from ﬁve weeks in the 1840s
to twelve days by 1913 and to nine days by the late 1960s.4
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4. The data for contract prices for government-assisted passages to Australia also suggest
little downward trend in nominal prices between the late 1840s and the early 1880s. But voy-
age times fell by 10 percent, and mortality fell by 80 percent (McDonald and Shlomowitz 1990,
1991).
Fig. 2.1 Gross intercontinental emigration from Europe, 1846–1939 (annual aver-
ages)In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century the dominant source of mi-
grants was the British Isles. These were joined from the 1840s by a stream
of emigrants from Germany, followed, after 1870, by a rising tide from
Scandinavia and elsewhere in northwestern Europe. Emigration surged
from southern and eastern Europe from the 1880s. It came ﬁrst from Italy
and parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and then from Poland, Russia,
Spain, and Portugal. As ﬁgure 2.1 shows, these migrants from southern and
eastern Europe, the so-called “new immigrants,” account for most of the
surge in numbers from the 1880s. About 60 percent of all European emi-
grants went to the United States. However, from the 1870s signiﬁcant ﬂows
developed—largely from Italy, Spain, and Portugal—to South America,
principally Brazil and Argentina, that is, from Romance language origins to
Romance language destinations.5
The characteristics of the emigrants also changed. It was no longer a
“family” migration. The mass migrants were typically young and single,
and about two-thirds of them were male. More than three-quarters of the
immigrants entering the United States between 1868 and 1913 were aged
sixteen to forty at a time when 42 percent of the U.S. population was in this
age group. Among men emigrating from England and Wales, only one in
nine traveled with other family members, compared with more than half in
the 1830s (Erickson 1994, 143).6 The migrants from any one country were
increasingly urban but remained largely unskilled. Nevertheless, European
migrants as a whole remained largely rural in origin as the sources shifted
toward the less developed southern and eastern Europe.
These outﬂows generated ﬂows of return migrants, small at ﬁrst (perhaps
10 percent of the outﬂow), but rising by the turn of the century to about 30
percent of the outﬂow. The extent of the return migration varied sharply by
country of origin, motive for migrating, whether it was family based, and
economic conditions in the destination and origin. The return migration
rates were very high for some groups, for example, Italian and Greek immi-
grants, and very low for other groups, such as eastern European and Rus-
sian Jews, who viewed themselves as refugees and, more than other groups,
migrated in a family context. In the absence of a social safety net in the des-
tinations, the return ﬂows were greater when the destinations were experi-
encing a recession. The return migrants, those returning often after only a
few years, were a sign of the growing globalization of labor, in part due to
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5. The surge of immigrants to Brazil from the 1880s owes much to the combination of the
abolition of slavery and the introduction of free passages (Leﬀ1982, 60). As was often the case
elsewhere, subsidies to immigration were ﬁnanced by export taxes, in the Brazilian case export
taxes on coﬀee. This intensiﬁed the linkage between immigration and international trade.
6. The change in the demographic characteristics of the migrants may well have reﬂected the
change in where they were to settle in the destination. With urbanization and the rise of in-
dustrial job opportunities, urban areas replaced farming areas as the primary destination. Al-
though accompanying wives and children may have been an asset for an immigrant intending
to become a farmer, they may have been perceived as a liability among those anticipating ur-
ban industrial work.the steamship’s lowering the cost—measured in money, time, and danger—
of oceanic travel. The return migrants often brought back to their home
countries skills, information, and capital acquired in the New World.
Although the discussion of the nineteenth century and pre–World War I
intercontinental migration has focused on the emigration of Europeans to
the New World, large-scale migrations were taking place in other parts of
the world. There were substantial movements within Europe itself, includ-
ing the Irish moving to Great Britain and eastern Europeans moving to
western Europe, sometimes merely sojourning before embarking for the
New World and sometimes remaining permanently. There was migration to
southern Africa from Europe (ﬁrst by the Dutch, then by the British), South
Asia, and East Africa. Asians, particularly from India, China, and Japan,
were also on the move, most often as contract laborers, to East Africa,
Southeast Asia, the Paciﬁc Islands, the Caribbean region, and the West
Coast of North America.
2.2.4 Asian Emigration, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
The increased globalization of the political system through the spread of
European colonization in the nineteenth century to Asia, Africa, and the
Paciﬁc and Indian Ocean islands resulted in increased intercontinental
trade, with sugar, rubber, jute, tin, and other primary products being pro-
duced in the colonies, much of it for export to Europe and North America.
The establishment of colonial plantation agriculture and mining, and the
development of transportation and communication, increased the demand
for low-cost pliant labor. In the absence of slavery, colonial governments
and business enterprises sought fresh sources and instruments to attract the
labor for these activities. The new source became Asia, and in particular In-
dia, China, and Japan. The new instrument was a return to an earlier means
of ﬁnancing migration—indentured servitude or contract labor.
Asia oﬀered a large supply of low-cost unskilled labor, but even with the
cost of international migration lower in the nineteenth century than in ear-
lier centuries, Asian laborers were too poor to ﬁnance the move. Indentured
servitude or contract labor was introduced both to ﬁnance the migration
and to provide the information networks to match workers to jobs. The con-
tracts (for Indian workers) were typically of ﬁve years’ duration. At the ex-
piration of the contract some of the workers had accumulated the resources
to return home. The poverty that drove them to become indentured ser-
vants remained, however, and for India, so too did the repressive caste sys-
tem. Most indentured servants (perhaps three-quarters in many times and
places) remained where they were, acquiring some land, working part time
in the plantations for wages, or migrating to urban areas. As a result, Asian
communities began developing in East Africa and southern Africa, North
America, Latin America, and Oceania, and nonindigenous Asian commu-
nities developed in Southeast Asia.
One of the largest of these intercontinental indentured servant migra-
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formal indentured servant system (1830 to 1916) over one million Indians
were transported overseas to further the British goal of empire building
and, indirectly, the globalization of the economy. Over one-half million In-
dian indentured servants went to Mauritius, and another half million went
to the Caribbean (primarily the south Caribbean, Trinidad, British Gui-
ana, and Surinam), with smaller numbers going to Fiji in the Paciﬁc Ocean,
Natal in southern Africa, and East Africa (Thiara 1995; Vertovec 1995).
Another group of Indian international migrants were the Sikhs who were
recruited into the British India Army after the 1857 Punjab Mutiny (Tatla
1995). Sikhs were considered by the British to be a “martial race,” and
many served in the British Army in Sikh units and were posted in various
parts of the Empire, often remaining when their tour of duty ended. Oth-
ers served in British police and military units in various parts of the British
Empire.
China was another major source of Asian labor, with indentured servi-
tude contracts being most prevalent from the 1840s to the 1920s. In addi-
tion to the poverty and demographic pressures prevalent in India, China ex-
perienced far more political turmoil. The indentured servant system was
less formalized in China than in India, and in addition to the indentured
servant contract for a ﬁxed period, a “credit-ticket system” was used in
which the loan of the ticket money was to be repaid. Although the Chinese
government’s oﬃcial position was to oppose emigration, its political weak-
ness prevented it from enforcing its will (Hui 1995). The Chinese indentured
servants were to be found in many sectors, including Malay tin mines,
Cuban sugar plantations, and railroad construction in the United States.
When the contracts ended, some returned to China, while others remained,
forming the nucleus of the emerging Chinese communities (Chinatowns) in
Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and North and South America.
Japan, too, was a source of emigrant labor, with somewhat fewer than one
million emigrants from the mid-nineteenth century to the early 1930s
(Shimpo 1995). Labor-recruiting agents and the labor contract system were
used. The Japanese workers went to Hawaii and the mainland United
States, as well as to South America, primarily Peru and Brazil, as inden-
tured servants or as recruited free immigrants.
Competition between Asian laborers and white workers, particularly in
California, led to the ﬁrst restrictions on immigration to the United States
based on country of origin. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and its sub-
sequent amendments, barred Chinese laborers from entering the United
States. With the annexation of Hawaii by the United States in 1898 and with
the 1908 “gentleman’s agreement” between the governments of Japan and
the United States, the emigration of Japanese workers to the United States
ended. Legislation in 1917 created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” which eﬀec-
tively prohibited the migration to the United States of persons from Asia
72 Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton(including the non-Asian-born descendants of Asians), with the exception
of the Asian Middle East.
In other regions the demand for indentured servants declined as changes
in technology reduced the demand for unskilled labor in plantation agricul-
ture and as small-scale farms owned by freed indentured workers and their
descendants produced the crops. The disruption of the world economy in the
two world wars and the Great Depression further disrupted international
migration from less developed to other less developed regions. Post–World
War II movements for independence among the colonies in Asia, Africa,
and Oceania reduced the political acceptability of low-skilled foreign work-
ers with ethnicities diﬀerent from those of the indigenous populations.
The colonial-inspired Asian migration to various corners of the globe
had long-term economic and political consequences. The presence of
Asians provided a substitute for, or competitors for, indigenous labor. Ten-
sions between the Asian indentured servants and their descendants on the
one hand, and the indigenous populations on the other hand, persisted
throughout the migration period but were held in check by the colonial
powers. With the transition to independence after WWII came violent con-
ﬂicts among ethnic groups. Conﬂicts between Indian-origin and African
peoples in East Africa, between the Indian-origin and native Fijians, and
between the Chinese and native Malays and Indonesians, among other con-
ﬂicts, have harmed their economic development and ended this form of
mass migration. Thus, a consequence of the post-WWII independence
movements that resulted in the demise of European overseas empires, in
particular the British Empire, was the decline in international migration
and the globalization of labor markets within the third world.
2.2.5 War, Depression, and Restriction, 1914–45
Mass migration fell sharply as war and depression halted the globaliza-
tion trend and immigration policies entered a new age of restriction. In the
United States, the quotas enacted in 1921 and 1924 favored the countries of
northwestern Europe and bit deepest into emigration from southern and
eastern Europe (ﬁg. 2.1).7Althoughthe quotas were binding in the 1920s on
new immigrant nationalities, a number of old immigrant nationalities fell
below the quotas. In the Depression of the 1930s, with few exceptions, even
new immigrant nationalities fell below quota (Gemery 1994, 180).8 Emi-
gration restrictions, introduced by some countries, such as the Soviet
Union, also limited opportunities for international migration.
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7. Although immigrants from the new source countries were four-ﬁfths of U.S. immigrants
in 1910–14, they were allocated only one-ﬁfth of the quota enacted in 1924 (and implemented
in 1929) (Kirk 1946, 84).
8. This was not always due to a lack of interest in migrating to the United States. Adminis-
trative rules were used by the U.S. authorities in the 1930s to restrict the immigration of Ger-
man Jews.Immigration to other destination countries fell less sharply as compared
with the pre–World War I period. The share of the United States in inter-
continental emigration from Europe was 51 percent in 1921–25, and 32 per-
cent (of a much smaller total) in 1931–35, in part because of the U.S. limits
on immigration. Some southern European migrants were diverted to Brazil
and Argentina, the latter receiving 3 million in the 1920s, although as many
as 2 million returned. But emigration from everywhere in Europe fell in the
1920s, with the exception of Poland and other eastern European countries.
And apart from Jewish emigration from Germany, the economic maelstrom
of the 1930s completed the process of deglobalization of the international
labor market. Indeed, in some years during the Depression of the 1930s the
return migration to Europe exceeded immigration, resulting in a negative
net migration rate to the United States.
2.2.6 Constrained Mass Migration, 1946–2000
The post-WWII period has seen a dramatic decline in the costs of travel
as a result of the shift from sea to air travel. It also has seen a decline in the
cost of information and communication that has also lowered the cost of in-
ternational migration. After the population dislocations following the Sec-
ond World War, intercontinental migration resumed, initially on a pattern
similar to before the First World War. The breaking of family ties that often
characterized pre-WWI immigration has become less relevant in the post-
WWII period. Yet the ﬂow of migrants has been partially controlled by im-
migration policies introduced in the major receiving countries earlier in the
century. Immigration policies changed sharply in the 1960s in the United
States, Canada, and Oceania, with a shift away from quotas that favored
immigrants from northwest Europe.
As ﬁgure 2.2 shows, total immigration to North America and Oceania
rose gradually to one million per annum in the 1990s. Although the absolute
numbers are similar to those in the age of mass migration about a century
earlier, relative to destination country populations they are much smaller.
Thus the annual immigration rate to the United States fell from 11.6 immi-
grants per thousand population in the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century
to 0.4 immigrants per thousand population in the 1940s, rising again to 4.0
immigrants per thousand population in the 1990s. The proportion of for-
eign-born in the population was 15 percent in 1910, falling to a low of 4.7
percent in 1970, then, with the growing postwar immigration, increasing to
8 percent in 1990 and 10 percent in 2000.9Although the immigration rate is
lower than at its peak in the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, its contri-
bution to population and labor force growth is similar because the rate of
natural increase has also declined.
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9. The proportion of the foreign-born in the population is inﬂuenced not only by immigra-
tion inﬂows but also by “exits,” whether through remigration or through death.There were three key structural changes in the pattern of intercontinen-
tal migration. The ﬁrst was the decline in Europe as a source of emigrants
and the rise of Asia as a source of emigrants. As ﬁgure 2.2 shows, European
emigration to North America and Oceania declined from the 400,000 in the
early 1950s to less than 100,000 per annum in the early 1990s. In part this
reﬂects a resurgence of migration within Europe. Thus, for example, the
share of emigrants from Portugal moving within Europe rose from 1.5 per-
cent in 1950–54 to 57.1 percent in 1970–74 (United Nations [UN] 1979).
Migration within Europe (including Turkey) grew rapidly in the early post-
war years through “guest-worker” systems, particularly in Germany, where,
by 1973 one in nine workers was foreign born. For Western Europe as a
whole, foreign nationals increased from 1.3 percent of the population in
1950 to 4.5 percent in 1990. Including the foreign-born who had become
naturalized would double this ﬁgure (Stalker 1994, 189–90).
In more recent decades Western and southern Europe has become a des-
tination for immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and since
the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s Western Europe has experi-
enced migration from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As a
result, net immigration to the European Union (EU) rose from 200,000 per
annum in the 1980s to over a million in 1989–93, falling again to 640,000 per
annum in 1994–98. Thus, in terms of inﬂows, the EU has now surpassed the
United States, and by more if illegal immigration is included.
International Migration and the Integration of Labor Markets 75
Fig. 2.2 Gross immigration to the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand: 1950–54 to 1995–98 (annual averages)The second key structural change was the transformation of Latin Amer-
ica from a destination to a source region, the mirror image of Europe’s (and
Japan’s) transformation from a source to a destination. Between 1960
and1980 the stock of immigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean who
were born outside the region fell from 3.7 million to 3.0 million, while Latin
Americans and Caribbeans residing outside the region increased from 1.9
million to 4.8 million. The changing sources of immigrants to the United
States are particularly instructive (table 2.2). Whereas more than four out
of ﬁve immigrants even as late as the early post-WWII years came from Eu-
rope and Canada, in recent years less than one in ﬁve come from there.
About half now come from Latin America, nearly equally split between
Mexico and the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.
The third key structural change for the countries of overseas settlement
during the postwar period was the increase in immigration from Asia, from
negligible numbers to a large ﬂow, and the beginnings of immigration from
Africa (table 2.2). The Asian migrants come from India, Pakistan, China,
Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam, among other places. The pattern of
Asian immigration was also observed in Europe, with the addition of
African and Middle Eastern immigrants. Among ﬁve main European des-
tination countries, immigration from developing countries rose from 97,000
in 1975–79 to 225,000 in 1990–93.10 For Germany alone, between 1975–79
and 1990–93 immigration from northern Africa and western Asia rose from
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Table 2.2 Region of Origin of Immigrants, by Decade of Immigration, 1921–98 (%)
Decade of Europe or Other Latin Number
Immigration Canadaa Mexico America Asia Africa Total (thousands)
1991–98b 17.6 25.5 22.3 31.0 3.7 100.0 7,582
1981–90c 13.1 22.6 24.6 37.3 2.4 100.0 7,338
1971–80 22.5 14.3 26.1 35.3 1.8 100.0 4,493
1961–70 47.0 13.7 25.6 12.9 0.9 100.0 3,322
1951–60 68.7 11.9 12.7 6.1 0.6 100.0 2,515
1941–50 78.0 5.9 11.8 3.6 0.7 100.0 1,035
1931–40 86.8 4.2 5.5 3.1 0.3 100.0 528
1921–30 82.7 11.2 3.2 2.7 0.2 100.0 4,107
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998, tables 2 and 4.
Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding.
aIncludes Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania.
bEight years. Includes over 1.3 million former illegal aliens receiving permanent resident alien status in
1991 and over 200,000 in 1992–97 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
cIncludes nearly 1.4 million former illegal aliens receiving permanent resident alien status in 1989 and
1990 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
10. United Nations 1998, 32–33. The ﬁve countries are Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.20,000 to 67,000 per annum, while that from sub-Saharan Africa rose from
a mere 1,200 to 22,000 per annum.
2.2.7 Contract Workers in the Persian Gulf, Post-1970
In the post-WWII period a major current of international migration
emerged around the Persian Gulf. The development of oil production and
exports in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, particularly the thinly
populated Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the
United Arab Emirates, led to a large increase in the demand for foreign
workers in the construction, trade, and low-skilled service industries, as
well as for more highly educated foreign workers, such as teachers, engi-
neers, and doctors. Initially this demand for imported labor was satisﬁed by
temporary contract workers from nearby parts of the Arab world—Egyp-
tians, Palestinians, and Yemenis, among others.
After the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), the redistribution of price-setting powers for crude oil from
the Western-owned oil companies to the exporting countries, the continu-
ing increase in world demand for oil, and the 1973–74 oil embargo, crude
oil prices reached unprecedented heights. The revenues from exported oil
from the Arab states that were members of OPEC increased from less than
$200 billion in 1971–75 to over $600 billion in 1976–80 (Abella 1995, 418).
The result was an extraordinary increase in the demand for foreign work-
ers. Although workers from other Arab states continued to move to the Per-
sian Gulf as contract workers, they were soon far outnumbered by millions
of temporary workers from nearly all parts of Asia—south, southeast, and
east Asia—with the sources moving eastward over time.11 The annual ﬂow
of Asian workers to the Middle East increased from less than 100,000 in
1975 to nearly one million in 1991. The share from Pakistan and India de-
creased from 97 percent in 1974 to 36 percent in 1991, and the share from
Southeast and east Asia and from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka increased to
42 percent and 22 percent, respectively, in 1991. By 1990 the stock of Asian
workers had grown to about 400,000 in Kuwait, to nearly one-half million
in the United Arab Emirates, to over 1.5 million in Saudi Arabia, and to
over 3.5 million in the entire Gulf region (Abella 1995).
The Asian workers came under short-term contracts (generally only one
to two years). Private agencies were established in the sending countries, but
some governments (e.g., South Korea and the Philippines) were actively pro-
moting contracts for their construction companies and workers. The sources
also shifted. Contract workers from South Korea reached a peak in 1982 of
nearly 200,000 and then declined sharply, whereas those from the Indian
subcontinent and Indonesia followed a rising trend (UN 2000, 62, 110).
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11. For studies of the impact of this labor migration on the sending countries in Asia, see
Amjad (1989).The initial shift from Arab to Asian labor arose in part because of their
lower labor costs, but also because the receiving countries wanted foreign
workers that would not settle permanently and who would be less of a de-
mographic, cultural, and political threat to the indigenous population than
other Arabs, who were more diﬃcult to segregate while in the country and
to repatriate. The “eastward” movement in Asia of the sources of migrant
workers was an attempt to diversify their origins to prevent any one group
from dominating. For the sending countries, of course, the arrangement
provided beneﬁts in the form of higher-wage jobs for many of their nation-
als, contracts for their construction ﬁrms, and substantial foreign exchange
in the form of remittances and repatriated wages and proﬁts (Amjad 1989).
As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting Per-
sian Gulf War (1991), many Arab workers (particularly Palestinians and
Yemenis whose leaders sided with Iraq) left or were expelled from the Arab
Persian Gulf states. Primarily for political reasons, the reliance on Asian as
distinct from Arab workers has since increased even further.
2.3 What Drives Mass Migrations?
2.3.1 Explaining Migration Streams
Mass migrations are driven by economic incentives, and numerous stud-
ies testify to that fact. The era of mass migration before the First World War,
when international migration was relatively unfettered by restrictions, is a
good time to examine the forces that determined patterns of migration. The
bias toward certain emigrant characteristics reﬂects the economic calculus
underlying their migration (Chiswick 2000). Although the young and single
might be more adventurous and enterprising, and had fewer ties (invest-
ments) speciﬁc to their origin and hence a lower cost of migration, they also
had the most to gain from the move. By emigrating as young adults, they
were able to reap the gains over most of their working lives while minimiz-
ing the costs of earnings forgone during passage, job search, and adjust-
ment in the destination. By moving as single adults they were also able to
minimize the direct costs of the move. Unskilled emigrants also had little
technology- or country-speciﬁc human capital invested and hence stood
to lose few of the economic returns from such acquired skills. The trans-
oceanic migrations from Europe also sought to minimize the loss of lan-
guage capital, with migrants to South America more likely to come from
Romance language countries, whereas those from the British Isles favored
North America.
What accounts for ﬂuctuations in migration streams? Since the pioneer-
ing study of Jerome (1926), there have been many studies aimed at identify-
ing the economic forces determining the uneven ﬂow of migrants from Old
World origins to New World destinations. The older literature was preoc-
78 Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hattoncupied with measuring the inﬂuence of “push” forces in the origin countries
versus “pull” forces in the destination, and with the relative signiﬁcance of
variables representing job opportunities (as measured by indexes of pro-
duction or employment) versus real wage rates.12 More recent studies have
used an economic decision-making framework in which potential emi-
grants compare expected future streams of income at home and abroad.
Following Todaro (1969), expected income depends on the wage rate and
the probability that the migrant will ﬁnd a job. Because migrants are risk
averse and because greater uncertainty attaches to the probability of em-
ployment (especially in the destination) than to the wage rate, and because
of greater cyclical ﬂuctuation in employment among new immigrants than
among natives, employment outcomes take a greater weight in the timing of
migration decision.13
Strong empirical support for this approach has been obtained for annual
time series emigration rates for a number of European countries in the late
nineteenth century (Hatton and Williamson 1998, ch. 4). The results indi-
cate that wage rates and employment rates, both at home and in the desti-
nation, all help explain the year-to-year variations in emigration rates. Em-
ployment rates had a powerful eﬀect, particularly those in the destination.
The fact that short-run emigration rates are so volatile, and correspond so
closely to booms and slumps, may seem surprising at ﬁrst sight. Given that
migration decisions are based on comparing future expected lifetime earn-
ings, one might expect that short-run changes, quickly reversed, would have
little eﬀect on this long-run comparison. The volatility can be explained by
the option value of waiting. Although the net present value of migration to-
day may be positive, it might be higher next year if conditions in the desti-
nation are expected to improve.14Moreover, when migrants are constrained
by limited wealth, the resources to ﬁnance the migration and adjustment
may be very sensitive to short-run factors. Hence, even where the decision
to become a migrant is based on long-run country diﬀerences in employ-
ment and wages, the timing of the actual move is closely correlated with
cyclical ﬂuctuations in source and destination countries.
Whereas unemployment rates were a powerful short-run determinant of
emigration, the long-run trends are determined more by changes in the
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12. The literature up to the 1970s was critically reviewed by Gould (1979), who pointed to
the lack of consistency in the results of diﬀerent studies.
13. This model is derived in Hatton (1995). A case can also be made for stronger real wage
eﬀects in the destination than the origin. A dollar increase in the wage in the destination has
income and substitution eﬀects that encourage migration, whereas a dollar decrease in the
wage in the origin has a substitution eﬀect that favors migration but an income eﬀect that dis-
courages it.
14. The option value of waiting is also incorporated in the equation dynamics (Hatton 1995).
Simulations that abstract from cyclical eﬀects and equation dynamics reduce the coeﬃcient of
variation of predicted emigration rates for Sweden, Norway, and Denmark by between one-
half and two-thirds (Hatton and Williamson 1998, 73).wage ratio. For emigration from the United Kingdom, a permanent in-
crease of 10 percent in the ratio of foreign to home real wages would in-
crease the gross emigration rate by 1.9 per thousand in the long run and the
net emigration rate by 1.4 per thousand. The overseas real wage was 69 per-
cent higher than the home wage on average over the period, and the present
value of the wage gains far exceeded the costs of passage.15 In part this re-
ﬂects the costs of location-speciﬁc human capital including job-related
skills and labor market information. It also reﬂects the compensating diﬀ-
erential needed to oﬀset the psychic cost of separation from family, friends,
and community.
Consistent with this, the other most important variable explaining emi-
gration rates is the stock of previous emigrants living in the destination. The
migrant stock captures the chain migration eﬀect where friends and rela-
tives who have previously migrated generate new migration by lowering
the costs and uncertainty of migration.16 This proves to be a very powerful
eﬀect, and it explains much of the long-run persistence in emigration
streams. In Italy, for example, cumulative previous emigration helps to ex-
plain why emigrants from the north continued to migrate to South America
despite a substantial wage diﬀerential favoring North America. Thus the
shift in the composition of Italian migration to North America occurred
only gradually between the 1870s and 1913 (Hatton and Williamson 1998,
ch. 6).
2.3.2 Long-Run Trends in Migration, 1850–1913
What explains why some countries produced few emigrants and some
produced many? And why did emigration rise for some countries and de-
cline for others? Table 2.3 illustrates the wide range of experience for Euro-
pean countries for decade average gross emigration rates in the age of mass
migration. The highest rates were for Ireland, averaging twelve per thou-
sand between 1850 and 1913. Norway and Sweden had rates approaching
ﬁve per thousand from 1870 to 1913, whereas those from Germany and
Belgium were under two per thousand, and that for France was close to
zero. These emigration rates also display diﬀerent trends. Emigration from
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15. This is a weighted average of real unskilled wage rates in the United States, Canada, and
Australia relative to the real unskilled wage rate in the United Kingdom. The estimates imply
that, holding other variables constant, a wage gap of 27 percent would just eliminate net emi-
gration.
16. Consider a destination country D that has no immigrants from the origin country Y. The
ﬁrst immigrant from Y to D may be indiﬀerent among a set of equally attractive destinations
within country D. If one destination is chosen, say at random, that destination becomes more
attractive than others in D for future arrivals from country Y. The original settler’s presence
provides lower-cost information and ethnic-speciﬁc goods and reduces information uncer-
tainty. Future migrants from Y to D are no longer indiﬀerent among the alternative destina-
tions in D. The formation of immigrant enclaves is a nearly universal characteristic of mass im-
migration ﬂows and is not necessarily a sign of “clannishness” but rather a response to
economic incentives and opportunities (Chiswick and Miller 2001).Ireland declined from the 1860s, and from Germany and Norway it de-
clined from the 1880s. Almost at the same time, emigration rates from Italy
and Spain began a steep ascent, a trend halted only by the outbreak of war
in Europe.
Various theories have been oﬀered to explain this wide range of experi-
ence. Diﬀerent studies have stressed the eﬀects of demographic forces, rel-
ative income incentives, structural change, poverty, and backwardness in
agriculture and the spread of information about emigration opportunities,
among other things (Lowell 1987, ch. 2). Recently assembled data for in-
ternationally comparable real wage rates make it possible to include real
wage ratios between source and destination countries to explain the emi-
gration rates displayed in table 2.3. Real wage ratios alone, however, have
only a weak inverse correlation (–0.20) with gross emigration rates. Other
variables must be included that systematically shifted the emigration func-
tion. One of these is the growth in the population in the emigration age
group, as measured by natural increase twenty years earlier. This captures
the hypothesis ﬁrst put forward by Easterlin (1961) that the demographic
transition in Europe drove emigration. Another variable is the share of the
labor force in agriculture, reﬂecting structural change—a variable that the
literature suggests could have conﬂicting eﬀects. One argument has it that
growing population pressure on limited landholdings generated emigra-
tion. Alternatively, it has been argued that rural populations were less in-
ternationally mobile than urban populations, which have often already
been uprooted from their rural origins. Finally, as noted earlier, the eﬀects
of friends and relatives’ providing information, supplying prepaid tickets,
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Table 2.3 Gross Emigration Rates from European Countries, 1850–1913
(emigrants per 1,000 population per annum, decade averages)
1850–59 1860–69 1870–79 1880–89 1890–99 1900–13
Belgium 1.90 2.22 2.03 2.18 1.96 2.32
Denmark — — 1.97 3.74 2.60 2.80
France — 0.12 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.15
Germany 1.80 1.61 1.35 2.91 1.18 0.43
Great Britain 4.83 2.47 3.87 5.71 3.92 7.08
Ireland 18.99 15.16 11.28 16.04 9.70 7.93
Italy — — 4.29 6.09 8.65 17.97
The Netherlands 0.50 1.67 2.66 4.06 4.62 5.36
Norway — — 4.33 10.16 4.56 7.15
Portugal — — 2.91 3.79 5.04 5.67
Spain — — — 3.91 4.63 6.70
Sweden 0.51 2.52 2.96 8.25 5.32 2.93
Source: Hatton and Williamson (1998, 33).
Notes:These ﬁgures are for gross emigration, drawn largely from Ferenczi and Willcox (1929).
Where possible, the ﬁgures include emigration to other countries within Europe. Unfortu-
nately, data on return migration are limited. Dashes indicate data are not available.reducing the costs of job search, and lowering the cost of ethnic goods are
reﬂected in the emigrant stock (per thousand of the population of the
source country).
These variables have been included in an econometric analysis of the em-
igration rates in table 2.3 (Hatton and Williamson 1998, ch. 3). The result
implies that a 10 percent rise in the destination to source wage ratio gener-
ates a rise in the emigration rate of 1.3 per thousand population in the ori-
gin, when controlling for the lagged dependent variable, among other vari-
ables. In the long run the share of the labor force in agriculture has a weak
negative eﬀect, suggesting that, on balance, agricultural populations were
less mobile internationally than urban populations. By contrast, the lagged
natural increase in the population has a powerful eﬀect, with emigration in-
creasing by about half of all births in excess of the number needed for a
stable population. It should be noted also that this was not the result of a la-
bor force boom pushing down the wage rate, since this eﬀect is already
taken into account through the wage ratio. Rather, it was a direct demo-
graphic spillover into emigration, which prevents an even sharper fall in the
origin wage rate. Finally, controlling for the lagged emigration rate, the mi-
grant stock abroad gives an eﬀect that implies that for each thousand pre-
vious migrants, a further twenty were pulled abroad each year.17
One important fact that theories of emigration must explain is this: Dur-
ing the onset of modern economic growth in Europe, national emigration
rates often rose, gradually at ﬁrst, reached a peak, and then declined. This
“life cycle” of emigration has been identiﬁed for a number of European
countries prior to World War I. The inﬂuences just examined can help ex-
plain this pattern. Figure 2.3presents a stylized picture of the European em-
igration cycle based on (quadratic) trends in the explanatory variables and
the (long-run) coeﬃcients of the emigration equation.18Rising incomes that
relaxed the “wealth constraint” provided resources to ﬁnance migration.
Demographic growth, a declining share of the labor force in agriculture, and
the consequent growth of the stock of previous emigrants together increased
emigration by about four per thousand in the upswing of the emigration
cycle. But the narrowing wage gap, as real wages in Europe converged on
those of the New World, had a countervailing eﬀect. Eventually the peak
was passed as continuing real wage convergence overcame the weakening
eﬀects of industrialization, demographic boom, and the migrant stock.
These results are conﬁned to western Europe, and they exclude eastern
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17. This eﬀect is much smaller than that typically obtained from estimation on annual time
series. When one uses decade average data, a part of the friends and relatives eﬀect will be
picked up by the lagged dependant variable, because recent emigrants are likely to be the most
important.
18. The trends in the explanatory variables were obtained by regressing each of them on a
variable that gives a numerical value to the stage of the emigration cycle for each country (and
its square). For further details, see Hatton and Williamson (1998, 47–49).European latecomers to mass migration. In these least-developed countries
and regions, despite the large incentive to emigrate, those who had the most
to gain were simply too poor to ﬁnance the move. Thus, some growth in
wages and income was a precondition for eastern Europe to enter into mass
migration—an eﬀect that has also been used to explain the late surge in em-
igration from Italy (Faini and Venturini 1994). On average, across western
Europe, the poverty constraint was not important because there was no ad-
ditional positive eﬀect for the home real wage. Once a migration ﬂow be-
came established, the help of friends and relatives who had previously emi-
grated served to attenuate the poverty constraint. This would help explain
why emigration could be so high from a country like Ireland and so low (at
least until the end of the nineteenth century) from the south of Italy, an
equally poor region. In the Irish case, the great famine of the 1840s eﬀec-
tively ejected a million Irish migrants, who formed a substantial migrant
stock, particularly in the United States. With the poverty constraint sub-
stantially attenuated, emigration from Ireland was large in the 1850s and
1860s but decreased as real wages in Ireland rose relative to those abroad.
By contrast, in Italy, emigration increased as growing incomes at home and
the growing migrant stock together gradually eased the poverty constraint.
2.3.3 Trends in Migration Since 1950
It seems likely that the same factors that drove mass migration in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can help explain the changing
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Fig. 2.3 The fundamentals driving emigration, 1850–1913composition of contemporary international migration. The dramatic con-
vergence of income and earnings in Europe, especially southern Europe,
during the so-called golden age from 1950 to 1973 helps explain the sharp
drop in the share of European migrants to the New World (ﬁgure 2.2, table
2.2). The rise in immigration from Asia coincides with the beginnings of the
“Asian miracle” of economic growth and the fall after 1975–84 in Asian
growth rates. As table 2.4 shows, the growth of the emigrating age cohorts
in these regions also contributed to the swings in the composition of migra-
tion. In Europe and in Asia, the growth of population aged twenty to
twenty-nine slowed after 1975 (UN 2000, 61). By contrast, in Africa the
population in this age group continued to surge—a fact that clearly inﬂu-
enced inter-African migration (Hatton and Williamson 2001).
Of course, since the Second World War immigration has been heavily
constrained by quotas and other regulations. Thus, migration pressures
cannot be so clearly observed, and trends in the sources of immigration may
largely reﬂect immigration policy. The end of country quotas for Europe
based on national origin and the end of the virtual ban on Asian immigra-
tion in North America and Oceania in the 1960s broke the preexisting link
between allocated quotas and nineteenth-century European immigration,
and opened the door to immigration from Asia (see further below). Subse-
quent legislation further altered the country composition of the quotas and
altered the rules governing employment-based immigration.
Where these constraints were absent, economic inﬂuences clearly shaped
the pattern of immigration. Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000) analyzed
those obtaining immigrant visas as husbands of United States citizens by
country of origin, because spouses of U.S. citizens are not subject to nu-
merical restriction. They found that, for the years 1972 to 1990, per capita
income in the origin country had a negative eﬀect on the number admitted,
whereas origin country education had a positive eﬀect (219). For Australia,
Cobb-Clark and Connolly (1997) examined an ex ante measure of immi-
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Table 2.4 Growth of Emigration Age Group on Four Continents, 1955–95
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
Growth in previous ﬁve years of population aged 20–29 (%)
Europe 3.1 –3.2 14.0 1.9 –3.7
Latin America plus Caribbean 11.1 12.3 19.9 15.5 8.5
Asia 10.6 4.8 21.4 13.1 9.0
Africa 11.6 10.4 14.4 17.0 14.3
Population aged 20–29/population aged 20–64 (%)
Europe 28.5 25.6 27.1 26.8 24.1
Latin America plus Caribbean 35.0 34.9 37.2 37.8 35.6
Asia 34.4 32.8 35.3 35.5 34.7
Africa 37.0 36.1 37.4 38.7 38.6
Source: Calculated from United Nations (1999, various tables).gration: the applications for skilled immigration visas.19 They too found
that real gross domestic product (GDP) ratios as well as relative unemploy-
ment rates between home and destination countries determined the ﬂow of
applicants.
Economic forces also explain ex post (policy constrained) outcomes. In
their study of postwar immigration into Germany (1964–88), Karras and
Chiswick (1999) demonstrate that immigration was determined by short-
term cyclical phenomena, as measured by unemployment rates, and by
long-term factors as measured by incomes per capita, in both Germany and
the sending countries. The lagged net migration rate, representing chain mi-
gration eﬀects, was also highly statistically signiﬁcant and important. For
the United States and Canada, Kamemera, Oguledo, and Davis (2000) ﬁnd
evidence that incomes, unemployment, population and a variety of other
economic variables inﬂuenced rates of immigration across source countries
and through time. Other evidence points to the immigrant stock as the most
important single determinant of the country composition of U.S. immigra-
tion (Yang 1995, 119). This reﬂects the fact that, since 1965, kinship to a
U.S. citizen or resident alien is the single most important channel of entry.
The famines and revolutions that caused spurts of migration in the nine-
teenth century also have postwar parallels. In Africa civil wars typically dis-
placed sixty-four per thousand of the population per year across interna-
tional borders, whereas government crises, coups d’etat, and guerilla
warfare had somewhat smaller eﬀects (Hatton and Williamson 2001, 11).
Some political upheavals have generated large ﬂows to the developed world.
The fall of Saigon in April 1975 produced a large-scale exodus of refugees
from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to the United States, and twenty-years
later the disintegration of Yugoslavia generated large ﬂows to the EU. Yet
the number seeking asylum in developed countries is also inﬂuenced by eco-
nomic factors. Applications to Germany for asylum in 1984–95 from sev-
enteen third world countries were inﬂuenced by relative incomes and by
the existing migrant stock, as well as by terror and armed conﬂict (Rotte,
Vogler, and Zimmermann 1997). Interestingly, they also responded to eco-
nomic conditions and asylum policies in France, suggesting that even asy-
lum seekers compared alternative destinations.
Given that the same variables inﬂuenced international migration ﬂows
before 1914 and after 1950, how diﬀerent are the magnitudes of the eﬀects?
There are really two questions here. First, are the unconstrained eﬀects the
same now as then? Second, how much diﬀerence does policy make? Net em-
igration from African countries, largely across the porous borders within
Africa, provides one benchmark (Hatton and Williamson 2001). Estimates
on panel data from the 1970s to 1995 indicate that a 10 percent rise in the
ratio of foreign to home wages increased net out-migration by 0.9 per thou-
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19. Of course, applications will be inﬂuenced by the anticipated outcome and hence by im-
migration policy.sand as compared with 1.3 per thousand in late nineteenth-century Europe.
The demographic eﬀects, although not directly comparable, are just as pow-
erful as they were in late nineteenth-century Europe. Thus, one piece of ev-
idence suggests that the relevant elasticities for unconstrained emigration
have not changed much between the two eras.
The eﬀects of immigration policy in attenuating economic eﬀects can be
illustrated by comparing estimates for emigrants from the United Kingdom
since 1975, when they faced immigration controls, with those for 1870–1913
(Hatton 2001; Hatton and Williamson 1998, 65). The “friends and rela-
tives” eﬀect operates even more powerfully now than in the late nineteenth
century because it has been reinforced by family reuniﬁcation policies.
Each thousand of the migrant stock generates between 50 and 100 percent
more new migrants per year in the postwar period as compared with the pe-
riod before 1914.20By contrast, the eﬀect of source-country unemployment
is between one-ﬁfth and one-third as large, and relative income between
one-tenth and one-ﬁfth, in the recent period as they were before 1914. Thus
the impact of immigration policy is to act as a ﬁlter that enhances immi-
grant stock eﬀects and mutes wage and employment eﬀects on international
migration.
Such orders of magnitude are at best a very rough approximation of the
eﬀect of policy. Nevertheless, they suggest that liberalizing barriers to mi-
gration would dramatically alter the demographic landscape, partly be-
cause of the increase in responsiveness to incentives and partly because of
the magnitude of those incentives. In the late nineteenth century, New
World real wages were double those in western Europe; today real wages in
the ﬁrst world are ﬁve to ten times those in the third world. Conservative es-
timates of the eﬀect of expanding the EU to include the ten central and
Eastern European accession candidate countries (with income levels 40
percent of those in the EU) suggest a westward movement of 3 million
people into the existing ﬁfteen EU countries within ﬁfteen years (Bauer and
Zimmermann 1999). Liberalizing immigration from the third world is likely
to produce much larger eﬀects, both relatively and absolutely, eﬀects that
would cumulate as rising immigrant stocks in the destination and rising real
wages at home relaxed the poverty constraint.
2.3.4 Illegal Immigration
As a result of immigration policy, the demand for visas by potential im-
migrants exceeds the supply made available by the immigrant-receiving
countries. The result has been queues for visas of increasingly length in the
immigrant-receiving countries, such as the United States, that ration, in
part, by queuing, and a growing population of illegal aliens in the developed
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20. Because of diﬀerences in model speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients estimated for the two pe-
riods are not strictly comparable. In particular, the pre-1914 model includes lags whereas the
post-1974 model does not. The range of magnitudes reﬂects the diﬀerence between using
short-run and long-run coeﬃcients from the pre-1914 estimates.immigrant-receiving countries.21 The illegal aliens include persons for
whom the cost of obtaining a legal visa is very high, for whom it is not pos-
sible to obtain a visa, or who are jumping ahead in the queue. Whereas some
of the host countries experiencing large illegal immigration are New World
countries of overseas settlement, such as Australia, the United States
and Canada, others are traditional countries of emigration that in recent
decades have been experiencing pressures for in-migration, such as Western
Europe and Japan (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment [OECD] 2000; Weiner and Hanami 1998).
The illegal workers, for various reasons, tend to be very low-skilled
(Chiswick 2001). This arises only in small part from the tilting of legal im-
migration opportunities in favor of highly skilled applicants. More impor-
tant has been the increase in wealth and information that facilitate illegal
migration even among low-skilled workers in the developing countries
of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and the greater diﬃculty high-skilled
workers would have relative to those of low-skilled workers in masking their
illegal status and in securing and maintaining employment comparable to
their skill level. Low-skilled jobs are less likely to require licenses, certiﬁca-
tions, and other documentation that might reveal one’s legal status. The is-
sue of the transferability of skills acquired in the origin is far more relevant
for skilled workers than for those with few, if any, skills. Illegal aliens are less
likely to bring dependent family members with them, because this would in-
crease the probability that their illegal status would be detected. As a result,
they are more likely to move back and forth between the origin and desti-
nation. For skilled workers there is a cost to this in the form of location-
speciﬁc skills depreciating when they are in the other location, whereas for
workers with perfectly internationally transferable skills or, more likely,
without skills, this depreciation does not occur. If illegal alien workers are
largely conﬁned to low-skilled jobs in the destinations, the wage diﬀerential
between the origin and destination is much larger for low-skilled than for
high-skilled potential illegal migrants.
The policy response has been threefold (OECD 2000; Chiswick 2001).
One has been to increase border enforcement. Although this has reduced
what would otherwise be the ﬂow of illegal alien workers, the borders have
been porous. Even island nations, such as the United Kingdom and Japan,
have discovered that liberal democracies cannot seal their borders. A sec-
ond response has been to improve the eﬀectiveness of interior enforcement,
mainly by imposing penalties on the employers of illegal aliens. Although
employer sanctions have been adopted in many countries, including the
United States (in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act), they have
been at most weakly enforced, as have other instruments intended to en-
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21. During the earlier era of mass migration, with few restrictions on entry prior to WWI,
illegal immigration was not a signiﬁcant issue. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant illegal aliens in the United
States were of Chinese origin in the 1880s, because they were the ﬁrst group to be excluded by
law (1882).force immigration law away from the borders. The third response has been
to convert illegal workers into legal workers through amnesties. Many of the
countries receiving illegal aliens have regularized their status, often in a se-
ries of amnesties.
The United States had the largest amnesty program. Under the provi-
sions of the two amnesty programs in the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act, nearly three million individuals received legal status, primarily
low-skilled workers from Latin America and their family members
(Chiswick 1988). Although the combination of amnesty and employer sanc-
tions was supposed to “wipe the slate clean” (amnesty) and “keep it clean”
(sanctions), illegal immigration to the United States has continued un-
abated, and it is estimated that there are again about ﬁve to seven million il-
legal aliens, primarily low-skilled workers, living in the United States. In the
late 1990s, the very tight labor market, the growing size of the illegal alien
population, and the diﬃculty that private-sector labor unions have had in
maintaining their membership base have resulted in a call from many quar-
ters in both major political parties for another amnesty. The political pres-
sure for another large amnesty diminished with the slow-down in the econ-
omy in 2001 and the terrorist attack by aliens in September of that year.
High-income liberal democracies are in a quandary. They oﬀer wage op-
portunities that are high by the standards of the sending countries. The in-
crease in wealth in the origin countries, the lower cost of transportation and
communication—and hence the lower cost of information about alterna-
tive destinations and the ease of staying in contact with the origin—and the
emergence of new immigrant enclaves have spurred incentives for low-
skilled migration. Legal barriers are introduced in part to protect low-
skilled native workers from this competition in the labor market, as well as
in the markets for public income transfers and low-cost housing. Yet these
legal barriers, including employer sanctions, are not fully eﬀective. Liberal
democracies will not adopt the draconian measures that would be needed
to prevent illegal migration or discourage its permanence once it occurs.
Because of the negative externalities and social problems associated with a
population living and working at the margins of or outside the law,
amnesties are introduced. However, rather than “wiping the slate clean,”
amnesties do not address the causes of the growth of the illegal alien popu-
lation, but they do encourage others to become illegal migrants, because
amnesties once instituted oﬀer the prospect of future amnesties.
2.4 The Immigrant Impact
2.4.1 Real Wage Convergence in the Age of Mass Migration
One of the most important questions both in the pre-WWI era and in the
post-WWII era is the eﬀect of immigration on the earnings and incomes of
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mobility, as well as the mobility of capital and tradable goods, should tend
to bring about a convergence across countries in real wage rates for workers
of a given level of skill in the absence of other factors that generate diver-
gent wages. Purchasing power parity–adjusted unskilled real wage rates for
Old World and New World countries show that real wage rates did indeed
converge. Between 1870 and 1913 the coeﬃcient of variation across seven-
teen countries fell from 0.50 to 0.43: Among the same seventeen countries
it fell from 0.45 in 1950 to 0.33 in 1987.22 The conjecture that mass migra-
tion played a part is strengthened by the fact that most of the convergence
in the late nineteenth century is accounted for by the erosion of real wage
gaps between the Old and New worlds, rather than among Old World coun-
tries or among New World countries. New World wage rates were higher
than those in the Old World: by 136 percent in 1870, by 100 percent in 1895,
and by 87 percent in 1910. In real wage terms the Old World caught up quite
a bit with the New World.
Convergence was modest between Great Britain and the United States.
Real wages in the United States were higher than those in Britain: by 67 per-
cent in 1870, 50 percent in 1890, and 54 percent in 1913 (O’Rourke,
Williamson, and Hatton 1994, 208). The contribution of international mi-
gration to Anglo-American real wage convergence has been analyzed using
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for the two economies cali-
brated for 1910. These models contain three output sectors, tradable man-
ufacturing and agriculture and non-tradable services, and three inputs: la-
bor and capital, which are mobile across sectors, and land, which is speciﬁc
to agriculture. Under a counterfactual of no immigration to the United
States and no emigration from Great Britain from 1870 to 1910, the real
wage would have been 34 percent higher in the former and 13 percent lower
in the latter. In the absence of the mass migrations the Anglo-American
wage gap would have doubled between 1870 and 1913 rather than falling by
one-ﬁfth; instead of convergence there would have been divergence (Hatton
and Williamson 1998, 213–6).23
The impacts were even greater elsewhere in the Atlantic economy.
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22. The countries included are, in the Old World, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; and in
the New World, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States.
23. This counterfactual assumes that capital stocks in the two countries would have been
those actually observed. As a result of the reallocation of labor, the return on capital would
have been 24 percent lower in the United States and 13 percent higher in Britain in 1913 under
the no-migration counterfactual. If, instead, the international capital market is assumed to be
perfectly arbitraged, then less capital would have followed labor from the Old World to the
New. As a result, under the counterfactual, wages in Britain would fall by only 6 percent and
those in the United States would rise by only 9 percent. Under the no-migration assumption,
the U.S.-U.K. real wage ratio would have increased from 1.67 in 1870 to 1.89 in 1913 with cap-
ital mobility, as compared with 2.47 in 1913 with no capital mobility. Hence, there would still
have been divergence in Anglo-American real wages.Among receiving countries, such as Argentina and Australia, the labor-
force–augmenting eﬀects of immigration were larger than in the United
States. And in Europe labor force losses were proportionately largest for
Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. In Ireland, postfamine emigration reduced the
population by a third between 1851 and 1911; in the absence of emigration
it would have risen by between 50 percent and 120 percent. Even on the
lower counterfactual labor force increase, a CGE model for Ireland indi-
cates that agricultural wages would have been lower by 16 percent and
nonagricultural wages would have been lower by 19 percent. Two-thirds of
Ireland’s catch-up on real wages in Great Britain was due to mass emigra-
tion. In the absence of emigration, the shift out of agriculture would have
been less rapid and the shift from tillage to pasture within agriculture less
marked (Boyer, Hatton, and O’Rourke 1994, 235).
Between 1870 and 1914 the Scandinavian countries and even Italy un-
derwent signiﬁcant real wage catch-up on Great Britain and the United
States. In Scandinavia real unskilled wages grew twice as fast as those in the
New World and well above the European average. In Scandinavia, emigra-
tion accounted for only a part of this spectacular catch-up; one-ﬁfth for
Sweden and Denmark and nearly one-half for Norway. Other forces, such
as industrialization, trade, education, and capital formation, accounted for
the rest (O’Rourke and Williamson 1997). In Spain and Portugal, by con-
trast, the failure of industrialization led to real wage divergence despite the
eﬀects of emigration in the other direction. Yet for the Atlantic economy as
a whole Taylor and Williamson (1997) ﬁnd that, in the absence of mass mi-
grations, the international dispersion of real wage rates would have dra-
matically increased. Instead of falling by 9 percent, the gap between New
and Old World real wage rates would have increased by 167 percent.
Real unskilled wage rates were not the only factor prices that converged
in the late nineteenth century, nor was migration the only source of conver-
gence. As labor was transferred from the Old World to the New, land prices
(and rents) boomed in the New World and stagnated in the Old. The inte-
gration of global commodity markets also contributed: A dramatic decline
in ocean freight rates and overland rates led to a trade boom. The New
World exported land- and resource-intensive goods and imported labor-
intensive goods just as the Heckscher and Ohlin model of international
trade would have predicted. For this reason, too, the wage rental ratio fell
in the New World and rose in the Old World, with clearly identiﬁable con-
sequences for trends in inequality. As we shall see, slow growth in real wages
and rising inequality in the Americas and Oceania contributed to what
Williamson (1998) has called the “globalization backlash” in the form of
rising barriers to both trade and migration.
2.4.2 Labor Market Impacts in the Postwar Period
In the post–Second World War period, rising concern about immigration
has been accompanied by a proliferation of studies aimed at measuring the
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presumptions have been the same as those that have guided research for the
epoch just discussed. That is, the increase in labor supply brought by immi-
gration should reduce the earnings of factors that are close substitutes for
immigrants, such as native-born labor, and it should raise the incomes of co-
operating (complementary) factors, such as capital, land, and—if the im-
migrants are unskilled—skilled labor.24 But the typical ﬁndings have been
very diﬀerent.
It is said that immigration policy is made at the national level, but the di-
rect impacts are largely felt in a small number of local areas. Thus, a char-
acteristic of immigrants in the major immigrant-receiving countries is a
very high degree of immigrant and ethnic geographic concentration. For ex-
ample, there was a very high degree of geographic concentration within the
United States among the foreign-born at the turn of the twentieth century,
just as there was a century later. In 1998, 9.9 percent of the population of
the United States was foreign born. Of the foreign-born, 71 percent lived in
only six states, with 30 percent in California (24 percent of the state’s pop-
ulation), 14 percent in New York (20 percent), 9 percent in Florida (16 per-
cent), 9 percent in Texas (12 percent), 4.5 percent in Illinois (9.9 percent),
and 4.5 percent in New Jersey (15 percent). The geographic concentration
of the foreign-born is even more intense when data are analyzed on a county
basis (Chiswick and Sullivan 1995). In the United States in 1990, 8 percent
of the population was foreign born. Among the 3,145 counties, in 1,521
counties (48.4 percent) the proportion foreign born was 1 percent or less; in
1,464 counties (46.6 percent) it was 1–8 percent; in another 109 counties
(3.5 percent) it was 8–16 percent; and in only 47 counties (1.5 percent) it was
16–45 percent (Chiswick and Sullivan 1995). Dade County, Florida, had
the record of 45 percent of its population foreign born.
Not surprisingly, numerous studies have attempted to isolate the eﬀects
of immigration on wage rates or wage changes by exploiting this cross sec-
tion’s variation. Of the many studies, most ﬁnd almost no eﬀect of the per-
centage of foreign-born on native-born wages (Greenwood and McDowell
1994; Borjas 1994). The largest eﬀects found suggest that a 14 percent in-
crease in the share of foreign-born reduced the wage of low-skilled native-
born workers by less than 1 percent (Altonji and Card 1991). Even this
seems surprisingly small. But the total eﬀect of immigrants on the economy
would be the same as the local impact only if local areas were (relatively)
closed economies. The mobility of labor, goods, and capital across regions
and localities within a destination country will produce a tendency toward
price equalization that would preclude observing a relationship between
immigration and wages and prices across local areas (Chiswick 1993).
There is abundant evidence that the settlement patterns of immigrants
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24. For models of the impact of immigration on the destination labor market, see Chiswick,
Chiswick, and Karras (1992) and Chiswick (1980, 1998).depend on economic incentives. A number of studies have examined the
intended destinations of immigrants arriving in the United States and
Canada at the turn of the century (Dunlevy 1978; Green and Green 1993;
Dunlevy and Saba 1992) and in more recent decades (Bartel 1989; Bartel
and Koch 1991). They ﬁnd that immigrants systematically migrated toward
states with relatively high earnings. This responsiveness to economic incen-
tives would tend to undermine any negative correlation between earnings
and the concentration of immigrants. But immigrants were guided by other
inﬂuences as well, settling ﬁrst in ports of entry and in areas with a larger
stock of previous immigrants from the same country of origin. As a result,
the geographic distribution of immigrants then and now diﬀers signiﬁ-
cantly from that of the native-born.
The skewed distribution of immigrant settlement inﬂuences internal mi-
gration among the native-born. An interesting “natural experiment” was
the Mariel boatlift in 1980, which brought an inﬂux of 45,000 Cubans into
Miami, equivalent to 7 percent of the Miami labor force. Card (1990) found
that this inﬂux had almost no long-run eﬀect on the size of the city’s labor
force or on the wages of competing groups of whites, blacks, and other His-
panics because of the mobility response of the native-born and previous im-
migrants. Filer (1992) examined native-born migration patterns across 272
localities in 1975–80. He found that, after controlling for local labor mar-
ket characteristics, an inﬂux of foreign-born workers crowded out native
workers one for one.25 There is also evidence along these lines for late nine-
teenth-century America. In the states comprising the northern quarter of
the country (New England, the mid-Atlantic, and the east-north-central re-
gions), changes in the number of immigrants across census years between
1880 and 1910 displaced the native-born either by generating westward out-
migration or by averting internal in-migration.26 Every additional 100 im-
migrants to the northeastern states displaced an estimated forty of the na-
tive-born population (Hatton and Williamson 1998, 168).
This discussion suggests that markets do respond to the impacts of im-
migrants and that the impacts are mitigated in the immigrant-receiving ar-
eas and are disseminated throughout the economy. Although immigrants
may be geographically concentrated, their impacts are distributed through-
out the economy, even to regions or sectors where there are no immigrants.
It also suggests that an analysis of the impact of immigrants in an advanced
industrial economy should focus on their eﬀects on economywide factor
proportions. In advanced industrial economies it also requires the explicit
recognition of the heterogeneity of labor, in particular, the distinction be-
tween high-skilled and low-skilled labor.
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25. Findings like these have been contested, most recently by Card and Di Nardo (2000).
26. The large internal migration of blacks from the rural south to the urban northern and
western cities had to await both low urban unemployment in the destinations and low immi-
gration from Europe.The relative supplies of high-skilled and low-skilled native workers and
immigrants diﬀer over time, as does the deﬁnition of what constitutes a
skilled worker. In an economy with two types of labor—say, high-skilled or
professional workers and low-skilled nonprofessional workers—and a
third factor, capital, the impact of immigration becomes more complex. If
diﬀerent types of labor are not strong substitutes for each other in produc-
tion, the immigration of one type of labor can not only aﬀect its wages, but
also aﬀect in an opposite direction the wages of complementary types of la-
bor (Chiswick 1980, 1982; Chiswick, Chiswick, and Karras 1992). The im-
migration of low-skilled workers (e.g., Mexican laborers into the United
States or Turkish laborers into Germany) would tend to depress the wages
of all low-skilled workers in the destination but raise the wages of the com-
plementary factors, including high-skilled workers and capital. This would
increase wage diﬀerentials by skill and earnings inequality. On the other
hand, the immigration of high-skilled workers (e.g., South Asian computer
programmers into the OECD countries) would tend to lower the wages of
high-skilled workers but raise the returns to low-skilled workers and the re-
turn to capital.
An interesting “natural experiment” with regard to the impact on relative
wages of exogenous immigration that diﬀered sharply by skill level in diﬀer-
ent periods in the context of a three-factor model is oﬀered by Israel. There
was a relatively large scale immigration of Jews from the 1930s through the
1960s into the Jewish economy of Mandatory Palestine/Israel that was pri-
marily exogenous to the wages in the destination and was large relative to
the destination economy.27These migrants were refugees and displaced per-
sons, whose choice of destination was motivated by religious and ideologi-
cal factors, as well as constraints on alternative destinations. Relative to the
size of the preexisting Jewish economy in Mandatory Palestine, during the
1930s there was a large Jewish refugee ﬂow with professional and other high
levels of skill from Germany and central Europe into a capital-poor econ-
omy. The result was a decline in the relative wages of skilled workers, a de-
cline in the rate of return from skill, and a very small earnings inequality.
Following independence (May 1948), Israel experienced a relatively even
larger inﬂux of refugees as Holocaust survivors (whose skills and health had
depreciated) and primarily very low skilled Jewish refugees from Arab
countries in North Africa and the Middle East, from Morocco to Yemen.
The large immigration of low-skilled workers depressed the relative wages
of low-skilled workers, increased the rate of return from schooling, and in-
creased earnings inequality (Chiswick 1974, 97–101). More recently, start-
ing in 1989, there was a large exogenous inﬂux of relatively high skilled Jew-
ish refugees into Israel from the various parts of the former Soviet Union,
referred to collectively as Russian Jews. This inﬂow increased the Israeli
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27. For a more detailed analysis see Chiswick (1974, 97–101) and the references therein.population by 7 percent in two years (1990 and 1991) and by 12 percent in
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (Friedberg 2001). The previous upward trend in
real wages halted in the early 1990s as the Israeli labor market absorbed the
increased labor supply, but returned later in the decade. Although a large
proportion of the Russian Jewish immigrants were in high-skilled jobs in
the former Soviet Union, it took time for them to learn Hebrew and for
some to transform their preimmigration skills into high levels of skill rele-
vant for the Israeli labor market, and for others, particularly older immi-
grants, this transformation did not and may never take place. Thus, by the
late 1990s, although some were able to join the high-skilled ranks in the la-
bor force, others remained in lower skilled jobs. The Russian Jewish immi-
grants helped fuel the growth in Israel’s high-technology sector (“Silicon
Wadi”) during the 1990s, but because of their wide distribution across skill
levels relevant for the Israeli economy, they had mixed eﬀects on the relative
wages in skilled occupations.
Economists have been slow to recognize that eﬀects such as these must be
measured at the economywide level. One recent study based on economy-
wide factor proportions estimates that about half of the increase in the wage
gap between those with less than and those with more than twelve years of
education in the United States from 1979 to 1995 was due to immigration
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997, 53). Between the mid-1890s and World
War I the wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled also grew, and this
has been associated with the ﬂood of “new” immigrants. But the evidence
suggests that it owed more to unbalanced derived demand growth favoring
skilled workers than to unskilled immigration (Williamson and Lindert
1980, 208–9, 236).
2.4.3 Adjusting to Migration
Economists have taken a long detour over assessing the eﬀects of immi-
gration on labor markets. Most of the work has focused on the United
States, and there has been little consideration of the impacts on sending
countries in the second era of globalization. Nevertheless, two things are
clear. First, in both sending and in receiving countries there have been both
gainers and losers from migration. Thus, migration’s main direct eﬀects
have been on the relative scarcity of factors, on relative factor prices and on
income distribution. Second, those eﬀects have been diﬀerent in the two
eras of mass migration. Among immigrant-receiving developed economies
the foreign-born are a smaller share of the population now than they were
in 1913, so their eﬀects should be smaller. Adjustments in other markets,
however, could also have attenuated or enhanced the impacts diﬀerently
across the two periods.
One development is the integration of capital markets examined in this
volume by Obstfeld and Taylor (ch. 3). Before 1914 capital and labor ﬂowed
in the same direction in the Atlantic economy: from the Old World to the
New. Immigrant-induced growth in New World labor supply drove up the
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curred in the Old World. As a result the marginal product of labor fell less
in the New World and rose less in the Old World than it would have in the
absence of capital market integration. In the computable general equilib-
rium framework, with perfect capital mobility and no international migra-
tion since 1870, the U.S. real wage in 1910 would have been 9.2 percent
higher than it actually was; capital would have retreated to Europe. As
noted earlier, with no capital mobility the real wage would have been 34 per-
cent higher in 1910, a big diﬀerence. For Great Britain, perfect capital mo-
bility cuts the eﬀect of emigration on the real wage by half, and for the At-
lantic economy as a whole, by three-quarters (Taylor and Williamson 1997,
47).
In the late nineteenth century, the endogenous ﬂows of international cap-
ital did not completely oﬀset the eﬀect of migration on wage rates. The main
reason is because of the importance of land, ﬁxed in supply and speciﬁc to
one sector: agriculture. Thus, one reason immigration impacts are smaller
now than a century ago is that agriculture and other land-intensive sectors
are now a much smaller part of developed economies. In the United States
the share of the labor force in agriculture and mining fell from 43 percent in
1890 to 3 percent in 1990, in Germany it fell from 44 percent to 4 percent,
and in Great Britain it fell from 22 percent to 3 percent.
What about trade in goods and services? In the Hekscher-Ohlin model,
trade between countries reﬂects their factor endowments and is therefore a
potential substitute for migration. In a frictionless, perfectly competitive
environment, migration-induced changes in relative labor intensities could
alter trade patterns and, through Rybczynski eﬀects, leave factor prices un-
altered. If such eﬀects mattered, we should see trade and migration moving
in opposite directions: Migration should make endowments more similar
across countries and thus reduce the basis for trade. But the crude correla-
tion suggests it did not. Migration and trade both expanded after 1850, as
they did again after 1950 (see Findlay and O’Rourke, ch. 1 in this volume).
An analysis of the determinants of trade volumes in the Atlantic economy
in the (relatively) free trade era before 1913 suggests that migration was not
an important inﬂuence (Collins, O’Rourke, and Williamson 1999). It seems
likely, however, that the eﬀects on trade were overwhelmed by other forces
that drove both trade and migration.
Alternatively, relative factor proportions could have determined the di-
rection of technical change. If endogenous biases in technical change re-
sponded to cross-country diﬀerences in factor intensities, then these would
push in the same direction as migration by augmenting the scarce factor.
Rather inconclusive debates point to labor-saving innovation in mid-
nineteenth-century America and to skill-saving technical changes in the
late nineteenth century, with neutral or opposite eﬀects in the Old World.
By contrast, there is widespread agreement that skill-biased technical
change has widened the wage distribution in Great Britain and the United
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permanence, and the magnitude of the eﬀects of skill-biased technical
change, rather than about its general direction.28 Whether endogenous or
not, relative biases in technology probably compounded the eﬀects of mi-
gration on factor rewards in both eras.
What about endogenous changes in the composition of migration itself?
In both mass migration eras there have been important streams of human
capital incorporated in workers who were highly skilled by the standards of
the day. In the eighteenth century the migration of European artisans was
frequently subsidized to bring high levels of skill to North America. These
artisans substituted for the importation of the products that they would
have produced in Europe and exported. With the Industrial Revolution oc-
curring in Europe in the nineteenth century, the new version of high-level
manpower, skilled industrial workers, ﬂowed from Europe to the countries
of overseas settlement to advance the development of industry in North
America and elsewhere. From 1820 to 1910 “entrepreneurs” were a higher
proportion of the foreign-born than of the native-born, although that
diﬀerence was declining (Ferrie and Mokyr 1994, 130).
With the development of science and technology in North America,
home-grown human capital provided much of the highly skilled manpower.
Skilled workers came as refugees, especially from Germany and other parts
of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, while others formed part of normal mi-
grant ﬂows, following the usual incentives. Recent evidence for the United
Kingdom suggests that the increase since the 1970s in the returns to skill, as
reﬂected in the widening income distribution, increased the skill content of
immigration (Hatton 2001). But this was in the presence of skill-selective
immigration policies. In the late nineteenth century and in the late twenti-
eth century the incentive eﬀects of returns to skill on the composition of mi-
gration have often been swamped as low-skill countries have entered into
the upswing of their emigration cycles.
A more important inﬂuence on the skill composition of migration is the
immigration policies of major receiving countries. Although the 1965
amendments to U.S. immigration law emphasized “kinship” to a U.S. citi-
zen or resident alien for rationing admissions, they explicitly included a
small skilled-professional-worker category. Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand placed far greater emphasis on the applicants’ skills in the ra-
tioning of immigration visas. In the late 1980s, but especially in the 1990s,
changes in U.S. immigration policy widened the scope for the admission of
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28. Consider the useful distinction between “worker (task-performing) eﬃciency” and “al-
locative (decision-making) eﬃciency.” Technological change that is neutral with respect to
high and low levels of worker eﬃciency will initially appear to be skill biased because workers
with more human capital also have greater allocative eﬃciency and are better able to quickly
and eﬃciently exploit the new technology. Whether the observed skill bias in the new com-
puter-related technology is permanent or temporary will depend on whether it only appears
to be so because of the temporary advantages of those with greater allocative eﬃciency.skilled workers as permanent resident aliens (as in the Immigration Act of
1990) and by creating and expanding a series of “temporary worker” pro-
grams for high-level manpower. Temporary worker categories were created
or expanded for registered nurses (H1-A and H1-C visas), trainees (work
experience for highly skilled workers; H3 visas), workers with extraordinary
ability (O visas), and athletes and entertainers (P visas); and under the um-
brella of the North American Free Trade Agreement, an exchange program
was established for high-skilled workers, primarily between the United
States and Canada. The best known of these temporary worker programs is
the H1-B visa, for workers with “specialty occupations” admitted on the
basis of professional education, skills, or equivalent experience. The H1-B
visas have been used primarily in the high-technology and higher education
industries, upon employers’ satisfying the U.S. Department of Labor that
after making a good faith eﬀort the employer has found no qualiﬁed worker
with a legal right to work in the United States who is available for and will-
ing to take the job at prevailing wages.29 The United States is not unique in
the inﬂow of high-skilled workers from other developed (OECD) countries
and from the developing countries, particularly Asia. Many of the other de-
veloped OECD countries are also importing high-technology workers from
each other and from the developing countries.30 Whether they are admitted
as temporary or permanent workers, the duration of their stay is likely to be
determined by their own wishes, rather than the initial intent of their host
countries. Among high-technology workers in particular, because of the
rapid spread of information and the industry’s use of English as the lingua
franca, there appears to be emerging a single worldwide labor market in the
developed countries, regardless of the worker’s country of origin.
2.5 The Political Economy of Immigration Control
2.5.1 Rising Barriers
Early in the age of mass migration, controls on migration were either ab-
sent or largely ineﬀective. But as the numbers mounted toward the end of
the nineteenth century, receiving countries became increasingly concerned
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29. The entrants under the temporary visa program for workers and trainees (H’s, O’s, and
P’s), as well as the professional workers who enter under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) increased from less than 75,000 in 1985 to over 430,000 in 1998, and the
numbers have grown since then. Their accompanying spouses and children increased from
over 12,600 in 1985 to nearly 105,000 in 1998. Thus, in 1998 these “temporary” migrants to-
taled over 535,000 individuals, rivaling the 660,477 persons admitted as “lawful permanent
resident aliens” (legal immigrants) in the same year.
30. In the decade of the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, approxi-
mately one million Soviet Jews and their family members emigrated to Israel, raising the pop-
ulation to six million. This was an unusually high-skilled mass migration, dominated by doc-
tors, engineers, and computer specialists. In addition to depressing the relative wages of highly
skilled workers, the inﬂux spurred the development of “Silicon Wadi,” the Israeli high-
technology sector.with controlling the ﬂow. The door to immigrants was closed gradually in
stages rather than being slammed shut, as is sometimes supposed. The shift
away from pro-immigration policies began in New World countries with the
regulation of shipping companies and emigration agents, the banning of
contract labor, and the banning of those who were likely to become “public
charges” or were considered undesirable because of their race or origin. The
positive inducements to immigration oﬀered by some countries also began
to diminish. Argentina abandoned its subsidies in 1890, as did Chile in
1891. From the 1880s, Australia and New Zealand progressively reduced
their levels of assistance, policies that were revived brieﬂy with subsidies
from the British government under the Empire Settlement Act of 1922.
In the United States, the Chinese were excluded by an act of 1882 and the
Japanese by a “gentlemen’s agreement” in 1908; all Asians (other than those
from the Middle East) were excluded under the “Asiatic Barred Zone” in
1917. After several attempts at legislation, the United States introduced a
literacy test, in any language, in 1917, although illiterate relatives (spouse
and children) of a literate admitted immigrant were also given visas. This
was followed by quotas based on national origins in 1921 and 1924, aimed
against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.31A literacy test was
introduced in Natal in 1897 and was followed by similar tests introduced in
Australia (the so-called “white Australia policy,” 1901), New Zealand
(1907), and Canada (1910).32Similar patterns of escalating restrictions were
adopted in South Africa and Brazil, culminating in quota systems in 1930
and 1934, respectively. Even the British dominions adopted severe restric-
tions limiting immigration from Britain: Australia in 1930, New Zealand in
1931, and Canada in 1932.
Post-WWII immigration policies are even more heterogeneous, but for
major receiving areas, they can be classiﬁed into four, often overlapping,
regimes. The ﬁrst of these is the guestworker systems of the early postwar
years. The best known is that of Germany, where wartime forced labor was
replaced ﬁrst by inﬂows of ethnic Germans displaced from territories lost in
the east and then, through a series of bilateral agreements, with guestwork-
ers from southern Europe and Turkey.33 Between 1960 and 1973, when re-
cruitment was abruptly stopped, about a million a year were recruited. Less
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31. The quotas established in 1921 restricted the annual number of immigrants to the num-
ber from each country recorded in the 1910 census. Those enacted in 1924 (eﬀective in 1929)
allowed 2 percent of the number of each nationality present in the 1890 census, which predates
much of the surge of emigration from southern and eastern Europe.
32. The white Australia policy involved a dictation test (as in Natal) in which the prospec-
tive immigrant was required to write out a dictated passage in a European language chosen by
the immigration oﬃcer. In practice this meant English, so that the white Australia policy was
really a British Australia policy. On this and other regulations, see Daniels (1995).
33. Initially, seasonal workers were recruited from Italy; subsequently, agreements were
signed with Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1961), and Yugoslavia
(1968). For a recent study of the guestworker experience, see Herbert and Hunn (2000, 189).well known and on a smaller scale were guestworker programs in France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of which were abruptly halted as a result
of the oil price increase and recession in 1974. In the New World, too, there
was active recruitment of low-skilled temporary migrants. Under the
Bracero Program in the United States (1942–64), initiated during the tight
labor market during WWII, workers were recruited, chieﬂy from Mexico,
and mainly to work in agriculture, under short-term contracts. And, as we
have seen, new guestworker streams became established in the Persian Gulf.
Second, there was a dramatic shift in the major immigrant-receiving
countries from systems based on national origins to worldwide quotas. In
the United States, prior to 1965, 70 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere
quota was allocated to the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany. The
1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act broke the link
between allocated quotas and past immigration, ended the virtual ban on
immigration from Asia, and introduced a quota for the Western Hemi-
sphere.34 Similarly, preferences for British, Irish, and other northern Euro-
pean immigrants were abolished in Canada in 1962. In Australia the “white
Australia policy” was abandoned, gradually in the 1960s, and then deci-
sively in 1973, although in New Zealand it had to wait until 1987.
It is not likely to be mere coincidence that the three major English-
speaking countries of overseas settlement abandoned their pro–northwest
European immigration policies at about the same time. High rates of eco-
nomic growth in these countries and the decline in emigration from Europe
due to the tight labor markets in Western Europe were important factors.
The growing civil rights movement in the United States was also in sharp
contrast to the openly racist “national origins” quota system still in eﬀect
since the 1920s. However, another aspect of globalization may have been
important. Much of Africa and Asia was gaining independence from the
former colonial powers of Western Europe. Clearly racist immigration poli-
cies in the United States, Canada, and Australia did not sit well with the
newly independent countries that were to become increasingly important
trading partners and neutrals or participants in the Cold War with com-
munism.35
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34. The system introduced in 1965 allowed an annual limit of 20,000 for immigrants for each
Eastern Hemisphere country, up to a total of 170,000, and a numerical limit of 120,000 visas
per year for the Western Hemisphere. In 1976 the same overall country quota and system of
preferences was extended to immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, and the two hemi-
spheric ceilings were combined into a worldwide quota. Immediate relatives of the U.S. citizens
(e.g., the spouse, minor children, and parents) were not subject to numerical limit and were not
charged to the quotas. Legislation enacted in 1990 modiﬁed the latter system by limiting some
of the kinship visas (in particular the sibling category) the larger the number of immediate rel-
atives admitted.
35. In the United States, the 1965 amendments replaced the “national origins” quota system
with a system largely based on kinship to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien. The in-
tention was to replace an obviously racist system with one that would appear racially neutral
but would largely replicate the countries of origin of the immigrants who came to the UnitedThird, humanitarian considerations were given an important role. The
widening in the range of source-country refugee admissions was often fol-
lowed by policies that strengthened rights of immigration through family
reuniﬁcation. These were underpinned by a growing body of international
agreements through organizations, such as the UN and the International
Labor Organization (ILO), aimed at protecting human rights.36 Humani-
tarian agreements such as the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, to
which a growing number of countries subscribed, also opened the door
from the 1980s to an increasing number of asylum seekers.37 In most coun-
tries of Western Europe, North America, and Australia, where primary im-
migration was limited by quotas or caps on work permits, some categories
of family reuniﬁcation and refugee admissions were unlimited in principle,
subject to the relevant conditions.
In addition, a number of countries gave amnesties to illegal immigrants,
notably France (1981–82), Argentina (1984), Italy (1977–78), and the
United States (1986; Stalker 1994, 152), with a further wave among EU
countries in the 1990s. At the same time, however, they began to tighten up
on the conditions for family reuniﬁcation and on the generosity toward asy-
lum seekers and illegal immigrants. In Europe, countries like France and
Germany revised their domestic laws and ordinances, and the EU’s summit
meetings in Dublin (1990) and Tampere (1999) sought mechanisms to reg-
ulate the ﬂow of asylum seekers. Several countries, including the United
States (1986), introduced sanctions against employers who knowingly hired
illegal aliens. The enforcement of these penalties on employers has, how-
ever, been very weak.
Finally, as we have seen, OECD countries have sought to allocate the di-
minishing share of visas going to primary immigrants increasingly on the
basis of skills. A skills component was introduced into the Canadian points
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States in the previous decades (Daniels and Graham 2001, 43–44 and 147–48). For a variety
of reasons this was not to be the case, and Mexican and Asian immigrants, rather than Euro-
pean immigrants, have become the largest beneﬁciaries of the kinship visas (Chiswick and Sul-
livan 1995).
36. The UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) were followed by other agreements
encouraging the protection of refugees and aﬃrming the primacy of the family. From the 1960s
a series of ILO conventions provided for equal treatment of nonnationals. Although not all
countries subscribed to these, a number of regional associations such as the EU, Mercosur
(South America), NAFTA (North America), and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) enunciated rights for migrant workers. On these and other agreements, see
UN (1998, 71–76).
37. For example, in the postwar period the United States provided for the admissions of
refugees from Communist countries and certain parts of the Middle East, but not from else-
where. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, however, the United States abandoned its largely “com-
munist country only” policy and adopted the UN language of deﬁning refugees as persons
with a “well-founded fear of persecution” for political, religious, ethnic, or several other rea-
sons, regardless of the communist orientation of the regime in the origin. The result was an in-
crease in the range of source countries and refugee admissions.system in 1967, which was later given more weight. Australia and New
Zealand also shifted further toward selecting on the basis of education and
experience and away from speciﬁc occupations (see Winklemann 2000).
These systems award points for education, experience, language skills, and
being in a prime age group, and they also include categories for business mi-
grants bringing capital or intending to start a business. Almost alone
among the developed countries, the United States sharply increased its em-
ployment-related immigrant visas in 1990, more than doubling what had
been a small skill-based employment visa program. Although a Canadian-
style point system was seriously considered by Congress in the late 1980s,
rather than causing a move to a point system, the 1990 Immigration Act re-
tained the U.S. employer-petition, job-speciﬁc (job-targeting) method of
rationing skill-based visas. Cumbersome administrative procedures (which
require that employers demonstrate to the U.S. Department of Labor that
there is no qualiﬁed person with a legal right to work in the United States
willing to take the job at prevailing wages) have limited the use of the em-
ployment-based visas, and the quotas have not been ﬁlled.
2.5.2 Explaining Policy Regimes
Dramatic shifts in policy and diﬀerences among countries have often
been explained on a purely ad hoc basis, but a literature has developed that
tries to systematically account for policy formation. Interest-group politics
link immigration policy outcomes with the actual or perceived eﬀects of
immigration, past or prospective, on diﬀerent interest groups or con-
stituencies. If those who stand to gain are politically powerful, then immi-
gration policy should be less restrictive than if the losers wield the most po-
litical muscle. It does not follow from this that economic determinism is the
only thing that matters. Politics also matter, and in several diﬀerent ways.
First, shifts in the political balance, either through the adoption of demo-
cratic institutions or through the extension of the franchise, could tip the
balance in favor of immigration control. This, together with the weakening
of landed interests and the growing inﬂuence of labor, particularly unskilled
labor since the mid-nineteenth century, should have shifted the political
balance against immigration, as it did in the early twentieth century. Sec-
ond, since economic interests may not be the only ones that drive immigra-
tion policy, attitudes to immigration and racial prejudice may matter inde-
pendently. Third, ethnic politics may be important, where members of an
ethnic group seek to encourage the immigration of those who will add to the
group’s size and power. Fourth, political elites may be captured by particu-
lar interest groups, or they may be suﬃciently strong (or impervious) to
pursue strategic aims independently of their political mandate. The bottom
line is that the same economic changes may translate into diﬀerent policy
outcomes across countries and over time.
To  explore the economic correlates further, Timmer and Williamson
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tries between 1870 and 1930. They explain declining openness by variables
representing the gains (or losses) from immigration for diﬀerent interest
groups. For Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the United States the ratio of
unskilled wage rates to GDP per capita was associated with more open
immigration policies. The resulting mass migration, by increasing the re-
turn on nonlabor assets, and shifting New World income distributions
away from labor, contributed to the policy backlash that began in the late
nineteenth century. The backlash also depended on the volume and com-
position of immigration itself. In Argentina and Australia, with relatively
homogeneous immigration streams, it was the rising share of foreign-born
that mattered; in Canada and the United States, where immigrant origins
were more diverse, it was immigration from low-wage countries that di-
ﬀered in ethnicity and religion from earlier immigrants and the native
population that helped close the door (Timmer and Williamson 1998,
752).
The eﬀects identiﬁed by Timmer and Williamson (1998) also seem rele-
vant to the partial reopening of the immigration door in the early postwar
period—but in reverse. The rapid growth of real wages, narrowing income
distributions, diminishing skill diﬀerentials, and falling foreign-born shares
should all have eased the pressure for restriction. This was reﬂected in
broadening access to previously excluded groups. European recruitment
policies of the 1960s, the United States Immigration Amendments of 1965,
and Australia’s abandonment of its British-only policy were each preceded
by a slowdown in the most desired source of immigrants. Thus, Germany
turned to southern Europe after the Berlin Wall went up; the United States
changed its policy as economic growth, demographic decline, and the bar-
riers to emigration from the countries controlled by the Soviet Union
stanched the ﬂow of Europeans; and Australia dismantled its British-only
policy as the numbers fell short of the 1 percent target.
Macroeconomic conditions also matter. If, at times of high unemploy-
ment, immigrants simply add to the unemployed pool or displace natives,
then no one beneﬁts and some lose. All groups then have an interest in
tightening immigration policy. Shughart, Tollinson, and Kimenyi (1986)
found that unemployment was a key determinant of policy restrictiveness
in the United States since the turn of the century, as reﬂected in either de-
portations or required departures relative to the immigrant ﬂow. Money
(1999, ch. 2) found unemployment to be the key explanator of restrictive-
ness in OECD countries since the 1960s. Casual empiricism also supports
these ﬁndings. Sharp increases in restrictiveness took place in Australia and
Canada in the early 1930s, and the abrupt ending of guestworker policies in
Europe in 1974 surely owes much to deteriorating economic conditions. In
postwar Australia, the unemployment rate has been found to be the single
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grant intake (Wooden et al. 1994, 304).38
2.5.3 Political Interest Groups and Coalitions
Globalization forces can explain why the immigration door to the New
World began to close in the late nineteenth century. That is, they help ex-
plain changes in immigration openness, but not necessarily the level of re-
striction prior to the 1930s. After all, these globalizing forces can be ob-
served from the middle of the nineteenth century. In economies where labor
was the source of income for the many, and capital and land were concen-
trated among the few, one might have expected the door to close earlier and
more ﬁrmly. One reason is that the democratic franchise was often limited
to male owners of property. Another is that agricultural or manufacturing
interests often formed powerful political coalitions. A third reason is that
opposition to immigration was balanced by wider national interests (Fore-
men-Peck 1992).
In countries like Argentina and Brazil, landowners and planters were the
dominant forces behind immigration policy. In the case of Brazil, the plan-
tation economy was supplied by slave labor until midcentury, but, under ex-
ternal pressure, slave imports ceased in 1852 and slavery was eventually
abolished in 1888. With the prospect of rapidly increasing labor costs, the
São Paulo coﬀee planters used their political inﬂuence over the government
of São Paulo and over the central government to lobby successfully for the
provision of free passage for immigrants from southern Europe.39 As a re-
sult, proﬁts of the fazendeiro were enhanced, although the gains to workers
“appear to have been negative” (Leﬀ1982, 68). But with the growth of man-
ufacturing and urban expansion from the turn of the century, the planters’
power to promote mass migration waned and ﬁnally evaporated.
By contrast, Canada and Australia were characterized by more repre-
sentative government, by ongoing imperial ties, and above all by develop-
mental states. Both countries were thinly populated and both adopted
nation-building policies that involved encouraging immigration but re-
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38. As in other countries, such as Canada, changes in immigration targets have often been
the subject of administrative control rather than requiring legislation as in the United States.
However, even in the United States administrative rules barring persons who were likely to be-
come a public charge were tightened in the 1930s (and more stringently invoked to reduce the
immigration of German Jews), and the requirements for labor certiﬁcation for the employ-
ment-based visas in the post-WWII period have a counterycyclical eﬀect.
39. Between 1885 and 1913 £11 million was spent in subsidies to secure this labor supply.
Leﬀ(1982, 61) argues that providing free passages was more proﬁtable to planters than paying
higher wages to attract more migrants. There are also reasons why planters would have pre-
ferred government subsidies to private subsidies, even though government revenues came
mainly from the coﬀee sector. One is that the implied pooling overcomes the free-rider prob-
lem, that is, the problem of tying the migrant to the employer who ﬁnanced the move. Another
is that some proportion of the costs would be borne by other taxpayers.stricting it to (relatively homogeneous) northern Europeans. In Canada the
National Policy from 1872 aimed both to populate the prairies through im-
migration and to industrialize through tariﬀprotection. In Australia, where
agriculture was relatively more important, where landholding was more
concentrated, and where (as in new South Wales) the squatters were a pow-
erful interest group, policy was more pro-immigration. But the foundation
of the Australian Federation in 1901 diluted these interests and led to the
more restrictionist white Australia policy.
In Europe, policy toward emigrationalso varied, although attempts to re-
strict emigration in countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland were
largely ineﬀective. Where landed interests were most powerful, such as in
Russia, emigration was illegal and the law was more strongly enforced. In
labor-abundant Great Britain, the declining inﬂuence of landed interests in
the early nineteenth century and the development of the Empire ensured a
strongly pro-emigration policy. And the rising inﬂuence of labor in the late
nineteenth century saw the introduction of the ﬁrst restrictions on immi-
gration in 1905.
Although the pre-1930 policies of most countries would seem to ﬁt into
a loose political economy framework, some observers see the United States
as an exception, at least before 1917. Limited imperial and nation-building
imperatives (post–Civil War), a wide democratic franchise, a burgeoning
industrial/urban sector, and widespread opposition to mounting immi-
grant ﬂows would seem to predict rising barriers to immigration. The myth,
if not the reality, of the westward movement of the frontier and of cheap
land provided scope for more immigrants, at least until the close of the nine-
teenth century, as did the expanding industrial and mining sectors of the
economy.40 The rise of nativism in the pre–Civil War period resulted in in-
dividual disqualiﬁers, that is, immigration restrictions against “socially un-
desirable” individuals, including those who were criminals, immoral, or
likely to become a public charge. In the postbellum period, nativist senti-
ment emerged again but was successful only in restricting the immigration
of Chinese laborers and, later, other Asian workers. On the whole, however,
the door remained open for Europeans until the 1920s.
In 1897, the U.S. Congress came within two votes of introducing the lit-
eracy test, but legislation was delayed for a further twenty years. Goldin
(1994) set out to explain why. She found that in the House of Representa-
tives votes in favor of the literacy test in 1915 were positively associated,
across cities, with falling wage rates, with population density, and with the
proportion of immigrants in the population. Thus, globalization forces
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40. Foreman-Peck (1992) speculated that American exceptionalism could be explained by
the fact that most immigrants were unskilled and that unskilled immigrant labor might be a
complementary factor to native-born skilled labor. However, his production function esti-
mates for U.S. manufacturing in the 1890s indicated that native- and foreign-born labor were
not complements—so the anomaly remains.were at work, but they were mediated by interest-group politics. With the
high unemployment of the 1890s, the alignment of nativist and labor inter-
ests generated almost enough votes to get the literacy test passed into law.
As prosperity returned, employers returned to a strong pro-immigration
stance. But now the South became more anti-immigration, partly to protect
its strength in Congress. Finally, the weakening of the urban pro-immigrant
vote, driven by rising isolationism stimulated by World War I, ensured suﬃ-
cient support to pass the literacy test into law in 1917. The literacy test,
however, was literacy in any language. It was thought that this would ad-
vantage potential immigrants from the more literate countries of north-
western Europe and disadvantage immigrants from the less literate south-
ern European and eastern European origins.
Thus, in what should, on the face of it, have been a strongly pro-labor
country, immigration restriction had to wait for an alignment of diﬀerent
interest groups with suﬃcient political muscle. Restrictionist policy became
ﬁrmly entrenched when, with the concern over the resurgence of immigra-
tion from Europe in the post-WWI period, the national origins quota sys-
tem was introduced in 1921 and reinforced in 1924. Immigration from the
more highly skilled countries of the “older” immigrant sources (northwest-
ern Europe) were favored, whereas immigration from the less developed
and less skilled “newer” immigrant sources (southern and eastern Europe)
was sharply curtailed.
2.5.4 The Public Opinion Puzzle
With the ﬂourishing of democracy in the postwar period, policy should
better reﬂect the balance of individual preferences. But here lies a puzzle: In
democratic countries, public opinion in recent decades has been far more
anti-immigrant than has public policy. A UN survey of government atti-
tudes toward immigration records that 8 percent of developed country gov-
ernments in 1976 considered immigration levels to be too high. This rose
rapidly in the 1980s to reach 29 percent in 1995 (UN 1998, 71). But this still
stands in sharp contrast with public opinion polls, which regularly ﬁnd that
two-thirds of the population would prefer less immigration. Studies of in-
dividual countries report that governments have consistently ignored wide-
spread clamor for less immigration. This leads to two questions: What
drives public opinion, and why is it not reﬂected in policy?
Recently a literature has emerged that analyzes public opinion polls to
gain greater understanding of the motives lying behind anti-immigration
sentiment. Economic self-interest is the most obvious motive, and this can
be related either to the individual’s own circumstances or to the tax impli-
cations of immigrant’s use of public services. Second, some analysts argue
that marginal groups are likely to identify with immigrants. Third, there is
“contact theory,” which essentially suggests that greater familiarity with im-
migrants reduces racism (although it could go the other way). A fourth fac-
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groups favoring the immigration of members of their own group formed
political coalitions with other such groups to favor more general pro-
immigration policies.
One study for the United States in the 1980s found limited support for
economic self-interest as reﬂected in being unemployed, being poor, suﬀer-
ing declining ﬁnances, or working as a manual laborer. But low-wage eth-
nic groups such as blacks and Hispanics were found to be less anti-
immigration, and those living in high-immigrant-density areas more
pro-immigration—a ﬁnding that supports marginality and contact motives
(Fetzer 2000, 95–107). Similar analyses for France indicated that cultural
threats were uppermost, whereas for Germany economic threats—for
example, being poor or a manual laborer—were stronger. In both coun-
tries geographic concentrations of immigrants generated greater anti-
immigration sentiment (Fetzer 2000, 131–39).
The most consistent results, from these and other studies, are that the
more educated are always less anti-immigrant, and that attitudes toward
immigrants vary with their legal status (e.g., legal or illegal) or ethnicity
(country of origin). These ﬁndings are supported in an analysis of British
social attitudes for 1983–90 by Dustmann and Preston (2001). They iden-
tify components of anti-immigrant sentiment arising from racism, concerns
about cultural conﬂict, concerns about jobs, and concerns about the costs
of welfare services. These in turn are related to the characteristics of indi-
viduals in the survey. They ﬁnd prejudice against West Indian and Asian
immigrants to be very strong, especially among the lowest education group.
Concerns about immigrant welfare use are stronger among those higher up
the income distribution. These results suggest a reason why the “classical”
interest-group results are hard to observe in the data for overall attitudes to
immigration where there is a redistributive welfare state. Those lower in the
income distribution are less concerned about competition for jobs and wel-
fare funds but are more racist, whereas those higher up are less racist but
more concerned about the welfare burden.41
A recent study of the attitudes of Australian-born adults toward immi-
grants and ethnic minorities provides additional insight into these issues
(Chiswick and Miller 1999). The analysis found that native-born Aus-
tralians did not view the ethnic or racial background of immigrants as im-
portant if the immigrants were committed to Australia (89 percent), but
they had negative reactions if “ethnic groups kept their own culture” (76
percent). They supported government subsidies for immigrants to learn
English and to learn of government programs (94 percent), but many op-
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41. For the United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) ﬁnd a clear negative relationship be-
tween education or skill level and anti-immigrant sentiment. Diﬀerences between the United
States and European countries may reﬂect the relative size of the welfare state.posed public money for ethnic groups to teach their origin language and
culture to their children (47 percent). Negative attitudes toward immigra-
tion arise among those born in Australia from a view that multiculturalism
is the basis of Australia’s immigration policy (86 percent). The immigrants
in the survey, on the other hand, had far more favorable attitudes toward
their maintaining their own culture, toward public subsidies for this, and
toward multiculturalism. The study also found that immigrants from non-
English-speaking countries who had more positive attitudes toward be-
coming Australian were more ﬂuent and literate in English. Thus, Aus-
tralians are more favorably disposed toward immigrants who want to be
“Australians” culturally, and immigrants who are more favorably disposed
toward becoming Australian have a more successful adjustment.
2.5.5 Public Opinion and Public Policy
One problem with such cross-sectional analyses is that they do not nec-
essarily capture the forces that underlie changesin attitudes, which might be
more relevant for public policy. Changes in real incomes, income distribu-
tions, the intensity of unemployment, racism, defense or strategic concerns,
or media hype will not be reﬂected in static cross sections. Alternatively, it
has been argued that the rise of an educated elite, beholden to, but not
locked into, landed or capitalist interests has damped or even eliminated the
impact of changes in opinion on policy. Thus, a recent study of postwar im-
migration policy in Great Britain concludes that “throughout the post-war
period British policymakers were, taken as a whole, more liberal than the
public to which they owed their oﬃce” (Hansen 2000, vi). Nevertheless, it is
clear that governments have responded to rising or falling anti-immigrant
public opinion but that the eﬀects of public opinion have operated imper-
fectly, with a lag, and its inﬂuence in electoral politics has varied across time
and place.
In Australia the proportion of adults saying that too many immigrants
were being admitted rose from a mere 16 percent in 1961 to 68 percent
in 1988. Betts (1988) argues that the lack of policy response in the face of
such seismic changes in attitudes was due to the rise of the educated (and
largely public-sector) elite. However, the steep increase in Australian anti-
immigrant sentiment came between 1968 and 1972, and it was followed by
sharp cuts in the immigration target by the incoming Whitlam government.
Although immigration was not a central policy issue in the election cam-
paign, it nevertheless played a key role at the margin in the Labour Party’s
election victory (Money 1999, 192).
Shifts in policy are not always reﬂected by changes in the ruling party—
either because other issues dominate or because policies toward immigra-
tion do not follow party lines. Thus, anti-immigration opinion increased in
Great Britain during the 1960s, but it had little inﬂuence in the elections be-
cause most voters failed to see a diﬀerence between the political parties
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immigrant stance. In the 1970s the rise of strongly anti-immigrant minority
parties shifted immigration controls up the agenda in majority party plat-
forms. Thus, the presence of Jean Marie Le Pen’s Front National inﬂuenced
the debate in the French presidential election of 1974, and the rise of the
National Front in Great Britain inﬂuenced Margaret Thatcher’s stance on
immigration in the parliamentary election of 1979.
Although immigration policies do respond to swings in public opinion,
one might still argue (as Betts does for Australia) that they are not tight
enough to reﬂect the widespread desire for less (often zero) immigration.
This is in part because the bulk of immigrants to the developed world in the
1980s and 1990s were admitted through family reuniﬁcation schemes or as
refugees. To some degree this reﬂects humanitarian policies that are em-
bodied in international treaties. But it also reﬂects the fact that reuniﬁcation
and refugee admissions command far more popular support than does pri-
mary immigration and, least of all, illegal immigration. Thus, seemingly
tough policies toward some (illegals and spurious asylum-seekers) and gen-
erous policies toward others (reuniﬁcation and refugees) largely reﬂect
diﬀerences in popular opinion toward these diﬀerent groups. At the same
time, such policies often imply loss of administrative control over the total
numbers admitted.
In the United States, attitudes toward immigration restriction cut across
the conventional liberal (Democratic) and conservative (Republican) party
lines. Pro-immigration policies are generally favored by conservative busi-
ness and fruit-and-vegetable agricultural interests, as well as by liberal civil
libertarians and members of recent immigrant and ethnic groups. Pro-
immigration policies are generally opposed by other conservative (nativist)
groups, blue-collar workers, and union oﬃcials, as well as by some popula-
tion control and environmentalist groups. With a declining trade union
base in the private sector and an increasing share of its membership of re-
cent immigrant origin, the leadership of the unions, particularly those in-
volving low-skilled workers in internationally footloose industries, has been
advocating a more pro-immigration position in the very tight labor market
of the late 1990s. It remains to be seen whether the adoption of these new
union attitudes will be reversed with a softening of the labor market.
The United States is seen as something of an exception in the late twenti-
eth century, just as it was in the late nineteenth. Some observers see the pro-
immigration bias embodied in immigration reforms since the 1965 amend-
ments as drawing its strength from the platforms of well-organized
religious, ethnic, and civil rights groups (DeLaet 2000). A left-right coali-
tion of these groups and employers’ organizations provided support for the
1990 Immigration Act, which signiﬁcantly raised the overall immigration
quota despite opposition of the general public. Employer groups supported
an increase in employment-based visas, whereas ethnic and civil rights
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This coalition dominated the weaker and less united interest groups, in-
cluding labor unions and conservative anti-immigrant groups, such as the
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). Thus, just as one in-
terest group coalition pushed the door closed in the early twentieth century,
another propped it open wider in the late twentieth century.
2.6 Conclusions: Migration and Policy
2.6.1 Migration and Globalization in the Long Run
Immigration policy clearly has responded to globalizing forces since the
age of mass migration began in the middle of the nineteenth century. At the
end of the nineteenth century barriers were rising as labor became more
abundant in the New World, real wage growth slowed, and income distri-
butions widened. But the door was closed slowly and with a lag, as a result
of nation building, unrepresentative politics, or interest group dynamics.
Wars and the interwar depression intensiﬁed the process of restriction in the
short term, a process that was reversed as stability returned in the early
post-WWII period. In the early post-WWII years, narrowing income dis-
tributions and rapid wage growth provided permissive conditions for a re-
turn to a more open immigration policy in Europe and the New World. But
from the 1970s, a rising demand for migration was accompanied by slower
real wage growth and widening income distributions. Anti-immigration
sentiment increased rapidly, and in some countries this was reﬂected in pol-
icy tightening aimed against labor migrants.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the colonial empires
of the European powers furthered a dimension of globalization. Skilled
workers (administrators, engineers, doctors, etc.), primarily from the colo-
nial powers, were brought to the dependencies, but much larger numbers of
unskilled workers from Asia, primarily from India and China, were brought
to other less developed areas to work on the plantations and in the mines.
This dimension of the globalization of labor markets had largely ended by
World War I. Wars and the Depression interrupted the ﬂow. The post-
WWII demise of these empires due to independence movements in Asia
and Africa precluded its resuming.
The indirect eﬀects of globalization have also been important. In the late
nineteenth century, capital chased labor across the Atlantic to the resource-
abundant New World. Although this raised the rental rates on land, the free
ﬂow of capital attenuated the diminishing returns to labor. In the absence of
globalization in the capital market, it is likely that immigration controls
would have come earlier. When the global capital market did implode in the
interwar period, barriers rose more rapidly—even before the Great De-
pression. After the Second World War, as natural resource endowments be-
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eﬀects of migration on real wages and income distributions diminished.
Globalizing capital markets, by attenuating the wage impacts of migration,
helped to underpin liberalizing immigration policies up the mid-1970s and
to dampen the immigration backlash in the following decades.
The integration of goods markets also inﬂuenced the shape of immigra-
tion policy. In the late nineteenth century declining transport costs eased
relative factor scarcities and promoted wage convergence in the Atlantic
economy. It was reﬂected in the invasion of New World agricultural goods
into the Old World and of Old World manufactures into the New World. Al-
though trade eﬀects reduced the overall demand for labor in the Old World,
they increased the relative demand for unskilled labor. And in the New
World trade eﬀects increased the relative demand for skilled labor. In the
United States, at least, the McKinley and Dingley tariﬀs of 1890 and 1897,
respectively, were aimed at protecting skilled labor by raising tariﬀs on a
wide variety of manufactured and semimanufactured goods to protect
American industry and labor from foreign competition. Had they not done
so then perhaps barriers to immigration would have risen earlier, especially
considering the protracted depression of the 1890s.
From the 1970s the globalization of trade lowered the returns to low-
skilled labor in the ﬁrst world and raised them in the labor-abundant third
world. Trade hurt low-skilled workers in the ﬁrst world relative to the
skilled. Immigration simply added to the glut of low-skilled workers in the
developed economies that was being created by trade and technical change.
It is no surprise, then, that moves to restrict immigration since the early
1970s have been aimed principally at stemming the inﬂow of low-skilled
workers—family uniﬁcation policies notwithstanding.
2.6.2 The Future of Immigration Policy
The trend toward the integration and globalization of labor, product, and
capital markets observed over the past few centuries is likely to continue.
The decrease in the cost of information, communication, and transporta-
tion will encourage this development. The emergence of the poorer coun-
tries from the poverty trap will provide the resources to ﬁnance interna-
tional migration, as will the emigrant remittances of kinsmen already in
the high-income destinations. The continued pace of economic growth in
the developed (OECD) countries will draw immigrants. The advanced
economies will experience a high level of immigrant supply from the less de-
veloped countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Yet these immigrants
are entering technologically advanced economies in which there is a grow-
ing demand for high-skilled workers but shrinking relative employment op-
portunities for lower skilled workers. In this way the ﬁrst decade of the
twenty-ﬁrst century diﬀers from the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century. At
that time there were still expanding opportunities for low-skilled workers in
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Yet declining relative wages for low-skilled immigrant workers in the de-
veloped countries will still exceed the rising relative wages these workers are
likely to receive in their less developed countries of origin. This will tend to
bring about a greater convergence of wages by skill level across the globe.
The wages of the high-skilled and the wages of the low-skilled will show less
variance across international borders, but because of a steepening skill di-
ﬀerential they will show perhaps even greater inequality in earnings within
countries. This greater inequality and continued international migration is
likely to be exacerbated by a substantially lower-than-replacement fertility
rate in the economically advanced countries.
The current period diﬀers from the earlier period in another dimension
as well: There is now a much greater role for income distribution in the so-
cial welfare function. To a greater or lesser extent all of the developed
economies have evolved into modern welfare states. This is evident from the
much greater share of national income devoted to governmental income
transfers to low-income groups in various forms—welfare payments, child
allowances, unemployment compensation, health beneﬁts, and old age as-
sistance. This means that the widening of inequality (compared to what it
would be otherwise as a result of low-skilled immigrants) plays a more
prominent role in public policy. The result of increased low-skilled immi-
gration and continued shrinking of job opportunities for low-skilled work-
ers in the advanced economies as a result of the globalization of trade and
technological change will mean increasing shares of national income trans-
ferred by the government to the low-skilled and poor native-born and im-
migrant populations.
The result will be a continuation of a process that we are already wit-
nessing. Over the last few decades, the immigrant-receiving countries have
been giving greater preference to high-skilled immigrants and have made
the legal immigration of low-skilled workers that much more diﬃcult. This
has been done in the face of pressure for more “humanitarian visas” issued
on the basis of a refugee status or a family relationship to someone already
in the destination. Through the issuance of permanent visas or through
temporary visas (e.g., the U.S. H1-B program), allocated on the basis of the
worker’s skill or occupation-speciﬁc employer petitions, high-skilled immi-
gration can be expected to continue to grow.
A tightening of visa standards and numbers for kinship visas is also
likely. The tightening of visa requirements for low-skilled workers will in-
crease the supply of low-skilled illegal alien workers. Liberal democracies
ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to limit illegal immigration. Globalization is
bringing about the reduction in barriers to mobility across countries. For
example, the free movement of the citizens of the EU across member states
makes it that much more diﬃcult to limit the cross-border movement of im-
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ment. Free trade agreements even across countries with sharply diﬀerent
levels of economic development seem to bring forth arguments for less
stringent restrictions on the mobility of people (e.g., the United States and
Mexico in NAFTA). International tourism and family visits to relatives in
developed economies expand with globalization, facilitating illegal em-
ployment after a legal entry. Border enforcement is of limited value when a
liberal democracy shares a border with a less developed country, but the in-
crease in illegal immigration in Japan suggests it is no longer possible, if it
ever was, for even an island nation to seal its border from illegal entries
(Weiner and Hanami 1998). Enforcement of immigration law in the interior
of a liberal democracy, including the use of national identity cards and em-
ployer sanctions, comes into conﬂict with the growing appreciation for civil
liberties and eﬀorts to reduce regulatory burdens and the intrusiveness of
the state.
The likely result will be a menu of policies. Public policy in the high-
income countries will favor the migration of skilled workers of all sorts.
Eﬀorts to reduce family-based immigration will meet with only limited po-
litical success. Where they do not already exist, employer sanctions and na-
tional identity cards may be introduced to stem the tide of illegal aliens, but
they will not be used eﬀectively. Because draconian measures will not be
used, the growing low-skilled illegal alien population will be beneﬁciaries of
periodic amnesties.42 Until such time as there is substantial convergence in
the incomes of workers of the same level of skill in the origin and destina-
tion countries (as was the case between Western Europe and North Amer-
ica), legal and illegal immigration pressures from the poorer to the wealth-
ier nations will build up. Immigration restrictions may slow the numbers
and shape the characteristics of the legal migrants, but the globalization
and the integration of labor markets will continue well into the twenty-ﬁrst
century.
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Migration is a controversial and divisive issue. By taking a broad historical
perspective, Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton are able to cast new
light on an old debate. Their paper covers a lot of ground. It provides the
reader with a fascinating overview of the main trends in international mi-
gration starting back in the seventeenth century; it oﬀers an in-depth dis-
cussion of the determinants of mass migration; it then takes a close look at
the impact of migration; and ﬁnally it assesses the role of political economy
factors in shaping policies toward migration.
The main messages of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, mi-
gration is quite responsive to basic economic incentives. This is best seen in
the nineteenth century, before immigration policies took a restrictive turn,
thereby muting the impact of wage and employment conditions. Second,
the labor market impact of migration comes mainly through its eﬀects on
economywide factor endowments. Third, given the growing emphasis in
host countries on income distribution considerations, the restrictive stance
toward unskilled migration is likely to continue.
The ﬁrst point is well taken, although the explanatory power of wage and
employment conditions should not be overestimated (as the authors them-
selves acknowledge when they emphasize other factors, such as ﬁnancial
constraints, demography, and chain eﬀects). It is true, for instance, that the
migration transition in southern Europe during the second half of the twen-
tieth century owes much to the catching-up process with respect to the rest
of the continent. However, although there was some wage convergence, it
was at best incomplete. Moreover, while wage converged, unemployment
diverged. Given that, as shown by Hatton (1995), migration should respond
more to unemployment diﬀerentials than to wage diﬀerentials, we would
have expected emigration from southern Europe to rise rather than falling.
To understand why it did not we need to look at additional factors, such as
the levels of unemployment and income (rather than simply their diﬀeren-
tials). High unemployment rates in receiving countries may well discourage
migration, even if unemployment diﬀerentials are unchanged. Similarly, if
income rises at home, potential migrants may be increasingly unwilling to
suﬀer the emotional and cultural shocks associated with migration, even if
the wage diﬀerential with the host country remains unchanged. Finally, ad-
ditional factors emphasized in the so-called new migration literature may
also have a role to play. For instance, there is some evidence that the desire
for risk diversiﬁcation has been a signiﬁcant motive for emigration from
backward economies, where insurance markets are relatively underdevel-
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leave at the Ministry of Economy in Italy.oped. There are good a priori reasons to believe that it may have played a
similar role in aﬀecting intercontinental migration ﬂows in the nineteenth
century.
The second point, namely that the economic impact of migration works
through its eﬀects on relative factor endowments, is also well taken. Under
the reasonable assumption that migrants have less overall capital than na-
tives, income will fall, in a static model, and growth will slow down, at least
temporarily, in a dynamic model. However, we should not overlook one ba-
sic fact, namely that the welfare impact of immigration is not the same as its
growth and income eﬀect. This is better seen in a static Barry-Soligo model,
where gross domestic product (GDP) per capita deﬁnitely falls after immi-
gration of capital poor workers, but natives’ welfare unambiguously in-
creases. The fall in GDP is explained by the fact that immigrants are rela-
tively poor (they have little or no capital) and therefore drive down average
income in the host country. Natives gain, however, because the fall in wages
is more than oﬀset by higher returns to capital. Further immigration is even
more beneﬁcial to natives, since it drives down the wage of previous mi-
grants. Borjas (1995) has also noticed that the welfare impact of immigra-
tion is a decreasing function of the wage elasticity of labor demand. If wages
do not fall—say, because labor demand is inﬁnitely elastic—the welfare im-
pact is nil. There is a trade-oﬀ, therefore, between the welfare and the dis-
tributional impact: For the former to be large, we also need the latter to be
large.
The third part of the paper deals with the political economy of immigra-
tion. The authors highlight one puzzle, which is that “in democratic coun-
tries public opinion in recent years has been far more anti-immigration
than public policy.” This may be true, but the fact is that by and large immi-
gration policies have become signiﬁcantly more restrictive in the twentieth
century, after the First World War, than in the previous period. Interest-
ingly enough, this shift is mirrored by an opposite shift in the policy stance
toward trade that used to be quite restrictive in the nineteenth century and
was signiﬁcantly liberalized after the Second World War. There is therefore
an additional and equally surprising puzzle, namely the substantial asym-
metries in the policy stance on goods trade and migration. In the traditional
trade model, these aspects—and one could add capital ﬂows as well—are
all substitutes. Limiting one ﬂow is ineﬀective if the other ﬂow is unre-
stricted. Are voters in democratic countries therefore so myopic that they
do not realize that restrictions on immigration are negated by the liberal
stance on trade policies and capital ﬂows? The typical answer of the profes-
sion is that the relationships among migration, capital mobility, and trade
are complex and model dependent. However, we can be somewhat more ex-
haustive and note some factors that may plausibly explain why the stance
toward migration is more restrictive than that on trade. First, migration is
likely to be signiﬁcantly less reversible than goods trade. Whereas factor
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tection measures, expelling migrants on purely economic reasons is unac-
ceptable to most. Second, immigrants may compete with natives in the non-
traded-goods sector in a way that imports do not. In both cases, we would
still be left with the task of explaining why in the nineteenth century migra-
tion policy was more liberal than trade policy. Clearly, this is an area with
substantial scope for additional research.
To conclude, Chiswick and Hatton highlight two major diﬀerences be-
tween the ﬁrst and the most recent globalization episodes, namely the much
diminished demand for unskilled workers and the more signiﬁcant role for
income distribution considerations in receiving countries. There is, how-
ever, a third major diﬀerence, which has to do with the impact of migration
ﬂows in sending countries. Although this latter aspect is somewhat neg-
lected by the authors, they can hardly be blamed for such an omission, given
that even the Handbook of Population Economics says very little on this is-
sue. However, the truth is that although migration ﬂows played a key role in
fostering convergence between the Old and the New worlds until 1913, this
is no longer the case in the current globalization phase. The fact that immi-
gration policy is increasingly geared to limit unskilled immigration and fa-
vor skilled immigration has indeed far-reaching implications for sending
countries. First, unskilled labor ﬂows are no longer there to foster conver-
gence as they did quite successfully in the nineteenth century and in the
1960s in Europe. Second, immigration policy in receiving countries will ag-
gravate the brain drain and its related negative eﬀects on the sending coun-
try. There is also some evidence (Faini 2002) that skilled migrants have a
lower propensity to remit home, most likely because they tend to migrate
permanently and bring along their family. Overall, sending countries there-
fore lose on all three counts, the more limited role of unskilled migration,
the decline in human capital attendant on skilled emigration, and the
dearth of remittances ﬂows. There is still a long way to go to the globaliza-
tion of labor markets.
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